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I. INTRODUCTION
In The Pirates of Penzance, the sergeant of police sings:
When a felon's not engaged in his employment
Or maturing his felonious little plans
His capacity for innocent enjoyment
Is just as great as any honest man's...
With each new method of transferring value from one person's
control to another's, "felonious little plans" are devised to enable the
felon to obtain someone else's lucre the better to fund the felon's
"capacity for innocent enjoyment." As each new scheme appears,
defensive measures are developed to discourage the felonies. The first
gold or silver coins were "pared," reducing their intrinsic value, until
* J.D., 1935, Harvard; Formerly Reporter for Article 4 of the U.C.C. in its earlier drafts;
Public Member National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers; Distinguished Senior
Professor of Law, The Delaware Law School of Widener University.
** J.D., 1971, Southwestern; M.A., 1980, California State University; Associate Professor
of Law, University of North Dakota Law School.
The authors acknowledge the research assistance of Amy Sassier, Stephen J. Kelly, and
Robert Lanes, 3-Ls, and Kevin Vitelli, 2-L, all of Delaware Law School, in the preparation of
this article.
1. W. GILBERT & A. SULLIVAN, The Policeman's Song in THE PIRATES OF PENZANCE,
Act 11 (1880) (chorus omitted).
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the use of the milled edge put a stop to this fraud.2 When paper
money came to be used, the counterfeiting art was developed. This
crime has been reduced, but not eliminated.3 One successful criminal
ploy involved the production in Country A of a second issue of the
banknotes of Country B from the original plates. The same officials
who had placed the first order persuaded the private engraver to
reproduce the notes. The trouble was the officials had just become ex-
officials.4
When private parties started transferring value through drafts,
felons forged signatures to transfer the wealth to themselves.5 To-
day's check collection system discourages this scheme by forcing the
party considered best able to avoid or insure against the loss to do so.
If the forged signature is that of the drawer, the loss rests on the
drawee, which is charged, under present laws, with knowing its cus-
tomer's signature.6 If the forgery is the signature of an indorser, the
2. 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITrANNICA 579 (1960). The milled edge and, in some cases,
inscriptions thereon "were intended to put a stop to the practice of clipping and filing coins,
which was prevalent in the 16th and 17th centuries." Id. The accuracy and sharpness of the
milling separated genuine from counterfeit coins.
3. From 1933 to 1936, counterfeiters caused average yearly losses totalling $771,000. In
fiscal year 1937, losses were reduced to just over $519,000, and in fiscal year 1938, they fell to
$407,000. By the end of fiscal year 1939, losses were reduced to about $295,000. 6
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 592 (1980).
Fifteen years later, during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1957, U.S. secret
service agents captured $1,548,167 in counterfeit bills. Of that total, however,
more than $100,000 was successfully passed [to] storekeepers and cashiers; the
balance was seized before it could be put into circulation. In 1957 agents
arrested over 300 persons for violating U.S. counterfeiting laws.
Id. at 593.
4. Banco do Portugal v. Waterlow & Sons, Ltd., 1932 L.R. 452, 461 (1932).
5. In 1762, the landmark decision in Price v. Neal stated the rule that a drawee who paid
the draft cannot recover the payment from an innocent holder of forged drafts. 97 Eng. Rep.
871 (K.B. 1762). Lord Mansfield said that any negligence lay with the drawee. We suspect
Lord Mansfield based his negligence comment on the fact that there was no proof that the
drawer had received the then customary letter of advice of a drawing. The forger was
discovered and hanged for his crime.
Some American jurisdictions made exceptions to the above-stated rule before the Uniform
Commercial Code was drafted. The English courts appear to distinguish between instruments
bearing some authentic signatures and instruments which are total forgeries, and to permit the
payor to recover funds paid on complete forgeries under the doctrine of mistake. See National
Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Barclay Bank Int'l Ltd., [1974] 3 All E.R. 834 (Q.B.).
6. U.C.C. § 3-418 (1978). One justification for this rule is that the drawee is charged with
knowing its customers' signatures and has the power to verify those signatures. Another
proposed justification is that the banks are in the best position to prevent losses due to forgeries
through the development of methods to authenticate customers' orders which will be more
secure than signatures.
The rule of Price v. Neal is restated in U.C.C. section 3-418, with limited exceptions.
First, the section does not bar recovery of payment from one who is not a holder in due course.
Second, it does not prohibit recovery from a person who has not changed position in reliance
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loss rests on the person first dealing with the forger.' To ensure that
drawers and others will take care when preparing or handling drafts
or checks, the risk of the loss is shifted if it is proved that negligence
in the drawer's check issuance or reconciliation operations enabled
the forgery to occur.'
A. The American Check Collection System
As the check collection system has evolved in this country, fur-
ther opportunities for felons have arisen. The defensive measures
used to combat any new felonious little plans, if they are to be success-
ful, must integrate with existing systems of check collection. Solu-
tions that fail to do so will be impractical primarily because they will
not be cost-effective. Thus, before the authors analyze the most recent
felonious ploy, magnetic ink character recognition fraud, referred to
herein as MICR fraud, it is necessary to describe the existing check
collection system in the United States.
The American check collection system uses a series of debits and
credits to transfer depositary institution credit from debtor to credi-
tor. At each step in the journey of a check, the sender (the depositor
or a collecting bank) is credited with the amount of the check and its
recipient (the next collecting bank or payor/drawee) is debited for
that sum. To permit processing cost savings, these debits and credits
are provisional and reversible until the payor/drawee has received the
item and has had an opportunity to decide whether to honor or dis-
honor it.9 In order to preserve their ability to reverse the provisional
credits, depositary institutions have the right to place a "hold" on the
credit, preventing the customer from using the funds until the item
has had time to clear. 10
The "hold" or "delayed funds availability" policy of depositary
institutions discourages counterfeit checks. Also, lack of knowledge
on the payment. The U.C.C. also permits recovery from one who has presented the
instrument with knowledge of the forged signature. U.C.C. §§ 3-417(l)(b), 4-207(1)(b) (1978).
7. See U.C.C. §§ 3-417(l)(a), 4-207(l)(a), 3-417(2)(a), 4-207(2)(a) (warranty of title
sections). But see infra note 8.
8. U.C.C. sections 3-406 and 4-406 state general principles applicable to drawer
negligence. Section 3-405, which does not require proof of drawer negligence, makes certain
forged indorsements effective in the case of checks issued to imposters and in the case of
embezzling check signers or "name suppliers." While the justification for section 3-405 is that
the drawer, rather than the banking system, should control and insure against such employee
embezzlements, the Code contains no provision applicable to similar misconduct by employees
of a payee. One court has developed a common law negligence rule to deal with the
misconduct of a payee's employee. See Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609,
107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
9. U.C.C. § 4-201(1).
10. U.C.C. § 4-213(4).
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of just how large a check one can forge in a given situation with assur-
ance that it will not be dishonored by the payor has reduced the
targets used by many forgers. Yet losses continue, and the forgery
insurers continue to require larger and larger deductibles on their
bankers blanket bonds." The definitive and cost effective counter to
forged drawer's signatures has not yet been devised.
When the check collection process became automated by the
introduction of computerized record keeping and the use of the
"MICR line" to enable automatic "reader-sorters" 12 to work in har-
ness with an institution's main frame computer banks began to "pay"
most checks without any human ocular examination.' 3 By omitting
11. Insurers have been known to set the size of the deductibles. Conversations between
bankers and Professor Fairfax Leary, Jr. In United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Federal
Reserve Bank of N.Y., the deductible per loss was $100,000. 590 F. Supp. 486, 490 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
12. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
13. The practice varies from bank to bank. Some banks make no examination of
signatures. Signature inspection occurs in some banks for all items in excess of a
predetermined undisclosed amount. Some banks also inspect all items in randomly selected
accounts.
A survey made under Federal Reserve auspices indicated that the percentage of checks
handled rapidly declines as the amount of the check increases. Nevertheless, comparison of
the relative volume of checks with the amount of dollars represented by such checks discloses
why limited visual inspections can prevent untoward forgery losses. The following table,
excerpted from a Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta publication, illustrates the point:
Check Amount % Cumulative % Cumulative
Up to Volume Dollars
from 0.00 to








FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, A QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE CHECK
COLLECTION SYSTEM (1980).
According to the table, checks written for amounts up to $32 account for almost 48% of
all checks written, but only represent 1.4% of all dollars passing through the check system.
Checks written for amounts up to $2,048 account for about 98% of all checks written, and
they represent only about 23% of all dollars passing through the system.
Accordingly, if a bank were to inspect all checks written for amounts in excess of $32,
then approximately half of all checks written would be subject to inspection. A manual inspec-
tion of this size, however, say 19 billion inspections, would be far too costly. If a bank were to
inspect all checks in amounts in excess of $2,048, then only slightly more than 2% of the
checks written would be subject to inspection. In a bank paying 1 million checks per day,
[Vol. 40:737
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any visual comparison of the drawer's signature with the exemplar in
its records, the drawee runs the risk that a forgery will not be
detected. Signatures are often routinely checked, however, on large
items' 4 in all accounts, and less frequently on all items in randomly
selected accounts. In this manner, the resultant losses from occa-
sional forgeries are kept within cost-effective limits. The net effect is a
cost savings, although occasional and nonrepetitive forgeries remain a
liability of the payor bank.' 5
Long before the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code's
("the Code") article four on bank collections began, banks had noted
that about 99 1/2% by number, and 99 3/4% by value, of all checks
were paid.' 6 To save costs, a system evolved which called for the
payor to give notice of its treatment of an item only upon nonpay-
ment.17 Savings in message costs alone were very large. With this
system, collecting banks assume that an item has been honored once
sufficient time has elapsed to permit the item to be presented to the
payor and notice of dishonor to be received from the payor. No news
is taken as good news.
Thus, the collection system operates upon the basis of non-
inspection, notice of nonpayment, and delayed funds availability.
During the era of manual bookkeeping, banks devised "availability
however, the total number of checks to be inspected would still total approximately 20,000. At
a rate of 1,000 checks per hour, this would require 20 hours of staff time, and at 500 per hour,
40 employee hours would be required. Even at the slower rate, the inspection would only
permit about seven seconds per item. Considering employee restlessness, and other factors,
probably only five to six seconds would be spent per item. Only the crudest forgeries could be
detected if the clerk checked for anything beyond the existence of a signature rather than a
blank.
14. To avoid aiding some felonious little plans, no bank publicly discloses the amount
which will trigger a signature viewing. Even so, due to volume and time per item spent in
verifying, well-executed forgeries are often not detected.
15. The cost savings are based, in each bank, on a history of bank-absorbed forgery losses.
If the loss is shifted to the drawer under U.C.C. section 3-406 or 4-406, however, so that the
charge initially made to the drawer's account is not required to be reversed, no amount is
entered into the loss figures. This "preclusion" of the drawer should not be lost by any ruling
that the failure to examine all signatures on all items by the bank constitutes a failure to
exercise ordinary care, or is not in accordance with reasonable commercial standards, or
constitutes a lack of good faith. U.C.C. section 4-103(4) specifically provides that "[tihe
specification or approval of certain procedures by [Article four] does not constitute
disapproval of other procedures which may be reasonable under the circumstances." U.C.C.
§ 4-103(4) (1978). The comments to section 4-103 make the drafters' concern with the
practical needs of mass volume check clearing abundantly clear. Contra Medford Irrigation
Dist. v. Western Bank, 66 Ore. App. 589, 676 P.2d 329 (1984) (ruling that the failure of a bank
to examine all signatures prevented the shifting of losses which resulted from forged checks
from bank to its negligent customer under Oregon's version of section 4-406).
16. See Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns-The Current Check Collection
Problem, 62 HARV. L. REV. 905, 912 (1949).
17. This system is embodied in U.C.C. section 4-301.
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schedules" for use by bookkeepers. These schedules governed the
duration of the hold which could be placed on deposited items in
order to permit notices of nonpayment to be received.18 The holds
assumed that presentment would be made to only one payor and that
a prompt return would occur in the event of nonpayment. As the
schedules developed, the holds tended to be based on three time levels
only. The shortest hold period was for checks involving payor institu-
tions in the same city. The second, or intermediate holding period,
included payor institutions in the same state, and the third was for all
others. When the system was computerized, the programmers often
retained the same hold periods.19 The treatment of items drawn on
institutions in foreign countries varied, as their payment and credit
procedures were not necessarily the same as those adopted by domes-
18. For a description of the check collection process prior to automation, see Leary, supra
note 16, at 909-15.
19. The usual practice, adopted by state regulation under funds-availability laws in
California and New York, is a three-stage hold: same city, same state, and other. The way
checks are handled, presentation and return occurs more rapidly between big cities throughout
the country than it does between a city bank and a rural bank. For example, a check deposited
with a Los Angeles, California bank will be presented and any notice of nonpayment will be
received more rapidly if the check is drawn on a New York City bank than if it is drawn on a
rural bank in remote northern California. A computer program based on actual experience
would have saved much grief.
The following tables, borrowed in part from an article by Professor Jordan, report recent
hold periods in Philadelphia and San Francisco:
DAYS OF HOLD
Type of Bank Philadelphia San Francisco
Survey A Survey B
Commerical
Bank
Local Payor 1-5 2-7 1-7
Outside 3-10 2-15 1-15
Savings Bank
Local Payor 1-3 3-12 2-10
Outside 3-10 5-30 4-20
Credit Unions
Local Payor N/A N/A 5-10
Outside N/A N/A 5-14
1986] MICR FRAUD 743
tic banks.2"
To comprehend the present automated system of check collec-
tion, it is necessary to understand the numbering system used on
checks. The availability schedules, of course, assume prompt trans-
mittal of items from depositary institutions to payor institutions and
of return items back to the depositary.2' Each item and each notice of
nonpayment is physically transmitted. To facilitate this daily physical
transmission of millions of checks, depositary institutions utilize cor-
respondent or collecting banks, which receive the items, sort, and for-




Local Same State State
New York Regulations
Banks 2 3 6
Savings Inst. 3 4 8
California Regulations*
Dept. of Banking
Banks 2 3-4 8-9
Savings Inst. 4-5 4-5 9-10
Dept. of Savings & Ls.
Any Institution 4 4 10
Dept. Corps. for
Credit Unions
Any Institution 5 5 9
*California bases its regulations on the status of the payor institutions.
Jordan, Ending the Floating Check Game: The Policy Arguments for Delayed Availability
Reform, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 515, 555-56 (1985). The San Francisco survey, Survey A, was
prepared by the San Francisco Consumer Action group. Survey B was prepared by the Cali-
fornia Public Research Group. We have combined the nonlocal in-state and the out-of-state
holds since the distinction was not made in the Philadelphia survey. For the source of the
Philadelphia material, see the Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 25, 1985, § IV, at 1. The California
out-of-state hold shorter periods were from one to five days longer than the non-local in-state
holds. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, R. 10.190406(a)(l)-(2) (1984). The New York regula-
tions can be found in N.Y. Gen'l Regs. of the Banking Board §§ 34.1-34.5 (1983).
Professor Jordan sees an advantage in providing definite periods in order to treat certain
items, such as government checks, categorically; but felons can forge these too. See Jordan,
supra, at 553-54.
20. If checks are routed through a Federal Reserve Bank, the provisional credit becomes
usable in two days. Some banks, now that interest is paid on demand accounts, do pay interest
from "day of deposit." On the other hand, compare the 5% and 7% rates for such interest
with, for example, bank prime rates of 10% or so. This spread in interest rates is beneficial to
banks with long hold periods.
21. Prompt transmittal of items for payment by each bank is encouraged by the midnight
deadlines contained in the U.C.C. See § 4-202(2) (1978) (collecting banks) and § 4-302 (1978)
(payor banks). On the other hand, return items are handled manually and frequently travel
through less speedy means, such as the United States postal system.
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ward them on their journey from bank to bank until each reaches its
respective payor institution.2 2 As the use of checks increased with the
growth of business and commerce, and after the decision in Veazie
Bank v. Fenno23 stimulated banks to stress the advantages of using
checks, the problem of sorting the growing number of checks into
groups that were payable in the area served by each correspondent of
the depositary institution also increased in complexity. The banks
found that the boxes or cubby-holes used for manual check sorting
could be numbered and the sorting would be speeded if the checks
themselves bore the same number, rather than asking the clerks to
remember or to look up the name of each institution in the area of
each correspondent.24 As the Key to Routing Numbers states,
however:
Prior to 1910 no uniform system existed to identify and route the
growing number of drafts, checks and other payment documents
passing among the nation's banks. It was not unusual to have sev-
eral individual numbering schemes, each devised by a major corre-
spondent or money center bank-serving the same small region.25
Of course, to be effective, these numbers had to be printed on the
checks when the check books were printed.
After 1899, a presentment section of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law ("U.N.I.L."), in the states which adopted it, pressed
for speed in collections. Section 71 required presentment of demand
instruments "within a reasonable time after issue," or, in the case of
bills of exchange, "within a reasonable time after the last negotia-
tion."2 6 A same city/same day rule and a same day/deposit in the
mail rule for out of town banks developed, perhaps out of the rules for
notice of dishonor found in sections 103 and 104 of the U.N.I.L.27
22. The occasionally cumbersome nature of this massive paper shuffling is described in M.
MAYER, THE BANKERS, chs. 6, 7 (1981).
23. 75 U.S. 533 (8 Wall.) (1869) (ruling that federal tax on issue of bank notes could
constitutionally be imposed on state chartered banks).
24. The discussion of routing numbers is, in substantial part, taken from the preface to the
KEY TO ROUTING NUMBERS (1983) (the "KEY"). The American Bankers Association
selected Rand McNally, the publisher, to assign routing numbers and publish the KEY.
25. KEY TO ROUTING NUMBERS, supra note 24, at v.
26. Section 71 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (U.N.I.L.) reads:
Where the instrument is not payable on demand, presentment must be made
on the day it falls due. Where it is payable on demand, presentment must be
made within a reasonable time after its issue, except that in the case of a bill of
exchange, presentment for payment will be sufficient if made within a reasonable
time after the last negotiation thereof.
A check is one form of bill of exchange. UNIF. NEGOT. INSTR. LAW § 71, reprinted in F.
BEUTEL, BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 151 (1948).




As business became increasingly national in scope, a uniform
national plan was needed. The American Bankers Association
approved such a plan in 1911.28 It originally consisted of two num-
bers separated by a dash. The numbers were printed following or
near the date line on the check in the upper right hand quadrant, such
as "3-1" or perhaps "16-4." The numbers to the left of the dash iden-
tified the city or state of the payor. The numbers to the right identi-
fied specific institutions within the designated geographical area.29
The Federal Reserve System was created during Woodrow Wil-
son's administration.30 One of its tasks was to eliminate the deduc-
tions that some banks took when paying checks presented by mail
(the non-par banks). The Federal Reserve Banks were also instructed
to expedite the collection of checks. By the late 1930's and early
1940's, the volume of checks was overwhelming the banking system.
Then two developments occurred. One was a system of payor bank
processing called "deferred posting and delayed returns. ' 31  Items
Section 103. Where the person giving and the person to receive notice reside in
the same place, notice must be given within the following times:
1. If given at the place of business of the person to receive notice, it must be
given before the close of business hours on the day following;
2. If given at his residence, it must be given before the usual hours of rest on
the day following;
3. If sent by mail, it must be deposited in the post office in time to reach him
in usual course on the day following.
Section 104. Where the person giving and the person to receive notice reside in
different places, the notice must be given within the following times:
1. If sent by mail it must be deposited in the post office in time to go by mail
the day following the day of dishonor, or if there be no mail at a convenient hour
on that day, by the next mail thereafter;
2. If given otherwise than through the post office, then within the time that
notice would have been received in due course of mail, if it had been deposited in
the post office within the time specified in the last subdivision.
F. BEUTEL, supra note 26, at 166-67.
28. Id.
29. Numbers one to forty-nine represented the network of reserve cities then in existence,
and were assigned in the order of their population. Thus New York City was one, Chicago
was two, and Philadelphia was three. Albany, New York was 29. Numbers 50-99 designated
the 48 states and the District of Columbia. The numbers ending in zero (i.e., 50, 60, 70, 80 and
90) were assigned to the states which contained the principal collection centers in 1911, in the
following order: New York (50); Pennsylvania (60); Illinois (70); Missouri (80), and California
(90). The rise of the Sun Belt in the south and southwest came later with the development of
air conditioning and, in the deserts, water systems.
The numbers to the right of the dash represent individual institutions. Each received an
identifier having one to four digits. Because there were some 14,500 banking institutions in
existence at this time (and at an earlier time there were more), some overlapping was, and still
is, inevitable; but the duplication of numbers has been avoided in the same state or reserve city
and only rarely occurs within the same Federal Reserve district.
30. Federal Reserve Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913).
31. See Leary, supra note 16, at 912 n.12.
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received on Monday were "sorted" on that day, but the posting to the
account and the final decision to pay or not were deferred until Tues-
day.12 Clearing house rules were amended to permit items received in
the morning clearings of one day to be returned at the return item
clearing of the following banking day.33 By 1949, seventeen states
had adopted statutes authorizing this deferred posting,34 and by the
time the Code was promulgated in 1952, such statutes were in force in
almost all of the states.35 The Code, in section 4-301, adopted a simi-
lar rule.36
The second development, implemented in 1945, changed the
routing symbol to a fraction. The numerator was the old American
Banker's Association identifier. The denominator was either three or
four digits, depending upon which of the twelve Federal Reserve dis-
tricts covered the location of the payor bank.37
The fractions were used when the sorting was done visually and
manually, as it was in the period between 1947 and 1952 when article
four was being drafted. But the volume of checks to be processed
daily and the cost of physical sorting continued to rise. In 1956, the
automatic reader-sorters now in use appeared. These machines are
capable of reading magnetic ink print at a speed far faster than the
human eye and brain.38 The new system called for a different method
of placing the numerical routing symbols on checks. The symbols
had to be printed in magnetic ink character recognition (MICR) form
to permit the automatic reader-sorters to process the items. The
32. At the same time, a provisional settlement was made on Monday, subject to recovery
on Tuesday, for unpaid items returned.
33. See Leary, supra note 16, at 912 n.12.
34. Id. at 906.
35. See U.C.C. § 4-301 comment 1 (1978).
36. U.C.C. section 4-301(1) permits settlements "made before midnight of the banking day
of receipt" for demand items other than documentary drafts, to be revoked and recovered if
"before it has made final payment.., and before its midnight deadline it (a) returns the item;
or (b) sends written notice of dishonor or nonpayment if the item is held for protest or is
otherwise unavailable for return." U.C.C. § 4-301(1) (1978). The procedure is to supply a
voucher for the repayment and to return the item to the bank refunding the payment.
37. The second digit in the three digit denominator, and the third digit where Federal
Reserve districts 10, 11, and 12 were signalled, represented, in the case of numbers one
through five, the Federal Reserve Bank or branch closest to the payor bank. Sometimes
numbers six through nine were used to show special collection arrangements in the designated
district.
The last digit in the denominator formerly signified when funds would be available after
the check or other item reached the indicated Reserve Bank or branch. Now each Federal
Reserve district has its own meaning for the final digit, but it must still be used in the routing
symbols. KEY TO ROUTING NUMBERS, supra note 24, at v.
38. See Leary, Check Handling Under Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 49
MARQ. L. REV. 331, 334 n.8 (1965).
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space at the bottom of the check was selected for the MICR line. As
had occurred with availability schedules, the existing practice was rig-
idly followed with little or no space left for additional developments.39
Three "fields" for the MICR numbers were set up with two alterna-
tive formats, one of which had to be rigidly followed in order for the
reader-sorters to operate successfully. In one alternative, largely used
for personal accounts, the first field was the routing symbol, the sec-
ond was the so-called "on us" field, where the payor bank's own sort-
ing information was encoded, and the third was for encoding the
amount of the check. The "on us," or middle field, contained the
drawer's account number and check number. In the second alterna-
tive, usable only on checks longer than six inches, the drawer's check
number came first, followed by the routing symbol, the drawer's
account number, and finally, the amount. 4°
The routing symbol now consists of thirteen symbols; two "open-
ers," two "closers," and nine digits. The digits consist of an adjusted
denominator of the fraction, always consisting of four digits, immedi-
ately followed by the four digits of the institution identifier, and then
a final check digit to ensure that the preceding digits have been cor-
rectly printed or electronically transmitted, as the case may be.'"
B. MICR Fraud
With the introduction of the MICR line and automated process-
ing, the stage was set for a brand new felonious little plan, only it is
not necessarily so little. By forcing the item to go to two different
locations, the felon could prolong the total time the item and the
notice of nonpayment would take to get through the banking system
so that the ultimate notice of nonpayment would be delayed beyond
the established hold period. The felon could withdraw the funds and
effect a getaway before the scheme was exposed. Other causes of
"innocent enjoyment" would be served. It would no longer be neces-
39. The development of the standards for encoding checks with the MICR line is
described in Clarke, Mechanized Check Collection, 14 Bus. LAW. 989, 990-91 (1959).
40. Id.
41. Whenever either the denominator or the institution identifier does not have four digits,
the spaces preceding the actual digits are shown by zeroes on the MICR line. Thus 310, the
denominator representing the third Federal Reserve district, Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, will show as 0310 on the M1CR line. Bank number one in that district will be
0001 and the ninth, or check digit, will be determined by a formula applied to 03100001, which
in this case will be "1", so that the MICR routing symbol will be ".:03 1000011:."
The check digit is determined by multiplying each digit of the routing symbol by the digit
falling under it when 371 371 37 is written below. Then the resulting
0+21+1+0+0+0+0+7 is added, which here equals 29. The check digit will be the
number necessary to raise the last digit to a "0"; in this case the check digit is "1."
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sary for the felon to "case" the account on which the check was
drawn to see how large a check could safely be written before the
payor bank would return it for lack of sufficient available funds. It
would no longer be necessary that the item be drawn on an actual
account. Also, it would no longer be necessary to effect a "good" for-
gery so that payment would be made even if the check was one
selected for signature verification.42 It would only be necessary to cre-
ate an item that would continue traveling through the system long
enough for the hold period to expire a full day or two before a notice
of nonpayment would arrive.
This felonious little plan could be effective if the bank to which
the item was presented could be tricked into believing it was a genuine
item which had, through error, been "missent" to a bank other than
the bank on which it was "properly" drawn. On that assumption, the
first payor bank, or one of the intermediate banks, would divert the
bogus item to a distant bank rather than return it to the depositary
institution, thus preventing a return within the hold period. This is
the practice in the case of nonfelonious "missent" items. Indeed, the
second payor bank need not actually exist; it need only appear to
exist.43 As a practical matter, no processing clerk would take the time
to look in the most recent edition of the Key to Routing Numbers,"
even if the item was one selected for visual inspection. Therefore, the
felon would only need a superficial knowledge of routing numbers and
a gullible or felonious check printer. The scheme called "MICR
fraud" could thus come into being.
Northpark National Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. (Northpark),45
was the first civil MICR fraud case. The MICR line on the check
signalled Bankers Trust Company in New York (Bankers Trust), the
fraction on the check signalled Detroit, and the printed name was
"Bank of Detroit."46 The MICR line was not printed in magnetic ink
and therefore not machine readable. One of the first banks handling
the $62,500 item, however, placed it in a "carrier"47 and encoded the
42. See supra text accompanying note 14. It still would be necessary for the felon to
"case" his or her own account to determine the time span in which his bank would refuse to
honor a draft drawn against a provisional credit for "uncollected funds."
43. See, e.g., Northpark Nat'l Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 572 F. Supp. 524, 526 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). In Northpark, the printed name on the check was "Bank of Detroit," which
was not the name of any bank in existence in Detroit. This fact was not discovered until the
item reached the Detroit branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
44. KEY TO ROUTING NUMBERS, supra note 24.
45. 572 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
46. This information was acquired by viewing a photocopy of the check, which was
furnished to Professor Leary by counsel.
47. A "carrier" is a transparent glassine envelope which contains a lower edge of non-
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MICR line thereon in magnetic ink. A look at the Key to Routing
Numbers to verify the fraction or name would have shown that no
Bank of Detroit existed, but no one did so until after the check had
visited Bankers Trust via the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and
had been sent to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or directly to
its Detroit branch.48 There it was discovered that there was no Bank
of Detroit. The check was then returned through channels to the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which returned the check unpaid
to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas returned it through correspondents to the Northpark Bank of
Dallas. The check was, of course, returned unpaid after the expira-
tion of the "out of state" hold, and after the felon had successfully
withdrawn $62,500 from the account.49 Judge Whitman Knapp, sit-
ting in the Southern District of New York, ruled that the complaint
stated a cause of action in negligence and denied the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York's motion to dismiss.
The earliest case involving erroneous routing symbols involved a
printer's error. In Citizens State Bank v. Martin,5 ° the Supreme Court
of Kansas determined, without discussion, that a bank designated
solely by an erroneous MICR line was not a payor bank, nor was it a
collecting bank, and that it owed no duty to give notice of a delay in
transit.5' As we suggest later, the court correctly held that the bank
was not accountable for the item, but erroneously concluded that it
was not a payor bank.
In Martin, the bank delivered a book of checks with an erroneous
MICR routing designation to a customer. On discovery of the error,
the bank delivered a new book of checks and told the customer not to
use the prior book. All went well for about six months, until the cus-
tomer used some of the misprinted checks. 2 As a result, the cus-
tomer was convicted of felony theft. The Martin court ruled that the
bank receiving the item due to the faulty MICR line designation had
transparent white paper on which a MICR line can be encoded. The current cost is 1.2 cents
per carrier if purchased in quantity. In the alternative, banks may attach an adhesive white
strip to the bottom of an instrument, upon which the MICR line may be printed. The current
cost of the adhesive strip, if purchased in quantity, is 0.9 cents.
48. Despite much inspection of records, counsel could not establish either when the check
left Bankers Trust Company or how it arrived at the branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago. Telephone conversation between Professor Leary and Thomas Baxter, counsel for the
Federal Reserve Bank, after settlement of the case in 1985.
49. 572 F. Supp. at 527. The parties later settled after extensive and expensive discovery.
Phone conversation between Professor Fairfax Leary, Jr. and Judge Whitman Knapp (1985).
50. 227 Kan. 580, 609 P.2d 670 (1980).
51. Id. at 587, 609 P.2d at 676.
52. Id. at 581-82, 609 P.2d at 672.
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only those duties arising out of clearing house rules, and no violation
of those duties had been asserted.13 This case may well account for
the selection of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as the defend-
ant in Northpark and other cases. The Kansas drawer had adopted
the MICR line by using the misprinted check blanks,54 thus the
check, in fact, had alternate drawees.
The second successful MICR fraud scheme was described in an
opinion denying motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim on which relief could be granted. The scheme in United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(U.S.F& G. 1)55 involved a successful three-bank routing of a check
for $880,650 that worked despite flaws in the check production. The
felon selected the Union Trust Company of Maryland, in Baltimore,
as the depositary bank. The counterfeit check had printed on it the
name of a Philadelphia bank with an erroneous and misspelled street
address and wrong zip code, a printed routing fraction for the State
Bank of Albany, New York, and a MICR line routing symbol that
started with the designation for the New York Federal Reserve Dis-
trict's Utica Processing Center. The balance of the MICR routing
symbol indicated no known bank in that district. The check was first
sent to Albany, which stamped it "Sent in Error" and returned it to
Utica. The Utica Processing Center then forwarded the item to the
53. Id. at 584, 609 P.2d at 673.
54. Under U.C.C. section 3-102(l)(b), an "order" may be addressed to one or more
drawees "jointly or in the alternative but not in succession." The Uniform Negotiable
Instrument Law treated a draft drawn on a fictitious payee as a promissory note of the drawer.
UNIF. NEGOT. INSTR. LAW § 130, reprinted in BEUTEL, supra note 26, at 80. The U.C.C.
approach is different. Under the definition of "payor bank" contained in U.C.C. section 4-
105(b), the designated drawee should qualify as a payor bank even if it has no prior
relationship with the drawer, because the item is an order directed to it to pay. In the absence
of some preexisting relationship between the drawer and the designated drawee/payor bank,
however, the bank may dishonor the item with impunity. U.C.C. § 4-105(b) (1978). The
drawer of a check engages that upon dishonor it will pay the amount of the draft to any holder
or endorser. U.C.C. § 3-413(2). A drawee has no liability on the instrument until it accepts.
U.C.C. § 3-409(1). The result is that the drawer is liable on the instrument, but a fictitious
drawee will have no responsibility unless it accepts the item. See also, Federal Reserve Board,
Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. § 210.6(a)(2) (1985) which provides:
A Reserve Bank may present or send an item based on the routing number or
other designation of a paying bank or nonbank payor appearing in any form on
the item when the Reserve Bank receives it. A Reserve Bank shall not be
responsible for any delay resulting from its acting on any designation, whether
inscribed by magnetic ink or by other means, and whether or not the designation
acted on is consistent with any other designation appearing on the item.
Id.
55. 590 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), afl'd mem. - F.2d - (2d Cir. Mar. 14, 1986)




Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in a cash letter for payment,
not as a return item. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia sent
it to First Pennsylvania Bank which, two days later, refused to pay.56
The depositary bank had received the check from its customer on
May 6, 1980. Having heard no adverse news on May 15, 1980, it
permitted a $755,000 withdrawal from an account having an "avail-
able" posted balance of $881,615. To its horror, the depositary bank
received a telephone notice in the afternoon of May 16, 1980 that the
check for $880,650 was being returned unpaid. The true collected
balance in the account was only $965!"
We can assume that Union Trust Company of Maryland rapidly
informed its insurer of its potential loss of $754,035 and that the
insurer, with equal speed, reminded the bank that there was a
$100,000 deductible. They then, in an action which one can under-
stand, made common cause to find some other bank to which to shift
the loss. Counsel selected the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for
a New York suit and also started a Pennsylvania action against two
banks located there .5  The New York complaint was filed in the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York. As it had in
Northpark, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. On May
16, 1984, incidentally the fourth anniversary of that fateful day when
notice of nonpayment was received, Judge Haight, sitting in the
Southern District of New York, ruled that the complaint stated a
claim for relief.5 9
The district judges in Northpark and US.F. & G. I were both ini-
56. Id. at 490-91. Much of the factual material was obtained from materials filed with the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York's motion for summary judgment made upon the close of
discovery. It was supplied to Professor Leary by counsel for that bank. Additional facts have
been obtained from the U.S.F.&G. opinions, and from conversations with various counsel in
the case. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 620 F.
Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd mem, - F.2d - (2d Cir. Mar. 14, 1986) (U.S.F&G. II);
US.F.& G., 590 F. Supp. 486 (US.F.&G. 1) (prior ruling on complaint).
57. Although the felon's account had been opened at one branch, the large item was
deposited at another branch. The teller handling the deposit failed to place a hold on the
balance. The teller also failed to comply with a bank policy requiring tellers to notify the
branch manager when checks over $100,000 were received for deposit. 620 F. Supp. at 363-64.
The motion papers contain a copy of a "Disciplinary Memorandum" placed in the teller's
personnel file.
The felon, believed by the F.B.I. to have also obtained $192,000 by a similar fraud against
a Hartford, Connecticut bank (there was a "wanted" poster in the motion papers), apparently
believed that a six banking day hold had been placed, or that an earlier withdrawal would
arouse suspicion. A weekend intervened between May 6 and May 15.
58. Counsel sued the First Pennsylvania Bank and The Philadelphia National Bank. The
two cases were later consolidated in the Southern District of New York.
59. US.F.&G., 590 F. Supp. at 501. Subsequently, on October 19, 1985, Judge Haight
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tially faced with motions to dismiss complaints in negligence based on
a claimed failure of the Federal Reserve Bank, as a collecting bank, to
exercise ordinary care in handling items on their return journey. In
Northpark, Judge Knapp correctly found the governing rule in section
4-202 of the U.C.C.6 ° He adopted a narrow and, we believe, errone-
ous view of U.C.C. section 4-202(l)(e) on delay in transit after read-
ing the comments to earlier drafts of the subsection. 6' He did not
note the significant restructuring of the fundamental approach to the
system of check collections embodied in subsequent drafts, as we shall
subsequently explain, nor did he apply a broad reading of the word
granted motions for summary judgment submitted by the various defendants. 620 F. Supp. at
373.
60. 572 F. Supp. at 531. U.C.C. section 4-202 provides:
(1) A collecting bank must use ordinary care in
(a) presenting an item or sending it for presentment; and
(b) sending notice of dishonor or non-payment or returning an item other
than a documentary draft to the bank's transferor [or directly to the depositary
bank under subsection (2) of Section 4-212] . . . after learning that the item has
not been paid or accepted, as the case may be; and
(c) settling for an item when the bank receives final settlement; and
(d) making or providing for any necessary protest; and
(e) notifying its transferor of any loss or delay in transit within a reasonable
time after discovery thereof.
(2) A collecting bank taking proper action before its midnight deadline following
receipt of an item, notice or payment acts seasonably; taking proper action within
a reasonably longer time may be seasonable but the bank has the burden of so
establishing.
(3) Subject to subsection (l)(a), a bank is not liable for the insolvency, neglect,
misconduct, mistake or default of another bank or person or for loss or
destruction of an item in transit or in the possession of others.
U.C.C. § 4-202.
61. The relevant portion of the decision states:
The history of U.C.C. § 4-202(l)(e) can be traced at least back to the
Proposed Final Drafts Nos. 1 and 2 of Article III on commercial paper. The
relevant section in Draft No. 1 was appropriately entitled "Lost Items," see § 715
(Draft No. 1, April 15, 1948) (emphasis added), and in Draft No. 2 it was called
"Loss of Cash Items in Transit." See § 713 (Draft No. 2, July 30, 1948)
(emphasis added). Their respective notes and comments leave no doubt that the
"delays in transit" which the drafters contemplated were those occasioned by
mishaps in the mails. See Notes and Comments to Draft No. 1 at 71 (April 15,
1948); Notes & Comments to Draft No. 2 at 17 (August 2, 1948). See also UCC
§ 3-611(2) (1948 Edition). We have found nothing in the subsequent legislative
history to persuade us that the several stylistic mutations which eventually led to
UCC § 4-202(1)(e) modified the above described legislative intent.
572 F. Supp. at 531.
Notwithstanding the judge's conclusion regarding subsequent drafts, the later drafts and
the final draft were based on a different "system" which incorporates major changes. Among
other things, this different system 1) eliminated the liability of correspondent banks for the
conduct of their transferees, 2) eliminated different collection channels for cash items and
noncash items, and 3) omitted any specific duty to trace. See infra text accompanying notes
63-67.
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"transit, ' 62 necessitated by a systems approach to the MICR fraud
problem. Nor did he analyze the careful structure of U.C.C. section 4-
202.
As finally adopted, U.C.C. section 4-202(1) imposes on a collect-
ing bank the duty to use ordinary care in performing the five general
tasks of a collecting bank. Three of these refer to a collecting bank's
own actions.63 The other two tasks appear to have application to the
MICR fraud situation, but each of these tasks is triggered by the
requirement of "learning" or "discovering" an action by another
bank. The first of these duties is found in U.C.C. section 4-202(l)(b),
which requires ordinary care in "sending notice of dishonor or non-
payment or returning an item other than a documentary draft to the
bank's transferor ... after learning that the item has not been paid
.... "I The second subsection, U.C.C. section 4-202(l)(e), calls for
ordinary care in "notifying its transferor of any loss or delay in transit
within a reasonable time after discovery thereof. '65
One point both judges overlooked in the recent cases was the use
of the words "learning" and "discovery" in the two subsections as
conditions precedent to the necessity to act. Research should have led
to U.C.C. section 1-201(25)'s post-amble which explains that
"'[d]iscover' or 'learn' or a word or phrase of similar import refers to
knowledge rather than to reason to know."6 6 "Knowledge" means
actual knowledge rather than reason to know.67 Unfortunately, the
definitional cross references following the comment to section 4-202
do not flag these words for researchers.
In Northpark, Judge Knapp ruled that the complaint stated a
legally sufficient claim in negligence.68 He also stated that, at trial,
62. Because the system of holds is implicit in U.C.C. section 4-213(4)'s proviso that "the
bank has had a reasonable time to learn that the settlement is final," the "transit" involved is
the round- trip journey of the item to one payor bank and back unpaid. Also, it should be
noted that a bank never has actual knowledge that an item has been paid. More appropriately,
in any revision of the Code, the language should be "until the bank has had a reasonable time
to receive a return of the item if it is not being paid." U.C.C. § 4-213(4)(1978). On March 14,
1985, the decision was affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeals in a four page opinion
at Docket No. 85-7912, ten days after oral arguments.
63. U.C.C. § 4-202(1).
64. U.C.C. § 4-202(l)(b) (emphasis added).
65. U.C.C. § 4-202(l)(e) (emphasis added).
66. U.C.C. § 1-201(25).
67. Thus, grammatically the duty of ordinary care applies only to a bank's own actions.
Where actions by others are involved, the bank's affirmative duty to act is triggered only by
actual knowledge. This is consistent with U.C.C. section 4-202(3), which provides that a bank
is not responsible for the conduct of another bank or person or for another bank's insolvency
except, of course, as prior knowledge may affect the propriety of the selected routing. U.C.C.
§ 4-202(3) (1978).
68. 572 F. Supp. at 535.
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the plaintiff must prove that the differences in the MICR line and the
printed drawee named on a check arise predominantly when the
check is fraudulent, rather than through innocent error.69 If this
could be shown, a duty to notify the depositary bank would arise out
of the general duty of ordinary care. The judge's reasoning imposes a
duty arising, at best, from a "reason to suspect" rather than the actual
knowledge which is the basis of the duty to use ordinary care in send-
ing notice "when learning" that the item has not been paid.7°
In U.S. &G. I, Judge Haight placed the burden on the plaintiff
to convince the trier of fact of the foreseeability that returning the
item to the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia would result in that
Federal Reserve Bank's failure to return the check to Union Trust
Company without diversion. The plaintiff also had to prove that it
was foreseeable that loss would result from the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia's failure to return the item to Union Trust. Further,
the plaintiff had to prove the foreseeability, given existing banking
procedures, that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York would have
detected the fraud, detected the risk, and taken curative action.7'
This ruling ignored both the actual knowledge requirement of U.C.C.
section 4-202, which applies when dealing with the actions of another
bank, and the rule that a bank is not liable for the negligence of others
in the collection chain.
Judge Haight imposed other burdens, requiring the trier of fact
to determine whether this type of fraud was so common that the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York should have taken exceptional pre-
cautions to detect it in carrying out an overall duty to exercise
ordinary care. If the trier of fact determined that special precautions
69. Id. at 534-35. Judge Knapp stated:
If day-to-day banking experience should demonstrate that inconsistencies are
usually the result of simple error, there would be no reason to assume that a
conscientious banker should become alarmed at learning of an inconsistency or
deem it his duty to notify anyone. On the other hand, if day-to-day banking
experience should establish that such inconsistencies are usually an indication of
fraud, then it might well be argued that a collecting bank, in satisfying its
obligation of ordinary care, should take steps promptly to notify a prospective
victim in the collection chain.
Id. (citations omitted). The court also stated that "[t]he plaintiff may, if it be so advised,
amend its complaint to allege facts suggesting that routing code inconsistency should be
regarded as indicating the probability of fraud; and may conduct appropriate discovery on that
issue." Id. at 535.
70. See U.C.C. § 1-201(25). The two-pronged "own acts" and "actual knowledge"
approach of U.C.C. section 4-202(1) is needed to enable banks to cope, cost-effectively to the
holders of the 99% of the checks that are good, with an automated mass handling system in
which there is no time for the protective reflection implicit in the concepts of "reason to know"
or "foreseeability."
71. U.S.F&G. , 590 F. Supp. at 498.
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were unwarranted, the trier of fact should then determine whether
following standard banking procedures would have led to detection of
the fraud and anticipation of Union Trust Company's loss. 72 This last
element involved two further decisions. First, whether it was reason-
ably foreseeable that a check bearing inconsistent routing designations
would be rejected by the second payor. Second, if ordinarily such
inconsistencies result from innocent printers' errors, then the trier of
fact should consider whether the characteristics of the particular
check were such that a bank exercising ordinary care would have rec-
ognized the check as bogus.73
Quite apart from the extreme complexity of the trial evidence
that would be required under the above tests, and the resulting
probability that a jury would have difficulty handling such issues, this
application of foreseeability tests ignores the drafting precision of the
Code's bank collections material. There is no overall imposition of a
duty of ordinary care in U.C.C. section 4-202. It specifies five discrete
tasks to be performed with ordinary care.74 These tasks were specified
after lengthy consideration of the 1948-1952 mass production nature
of check collections. Furthermore, they apply equally to non-cash
items, and were carefully drafted in light of the nature of collections
of such items. The duty of ordinary care is imposed in two of the
tasks only after the condition precedent to the exercise of that task has
been satisfied, namely a "discovery" or a "learning" (that is, actual
knowledge). Section 4-202 recognizes that the duties of collecting
banks are ministerial and largely mechanical, except when the bank
presents an item to a nonbank payor. The duties were and are done
routinely by clerks performing monotonous repetitive tasks. These
jobs are now largely automated so that human inspection of checks
and other cash items is avoided whenever possible. Therefore, in the
case of sending notices or returning items, the Code required actual
knowledge of a prior nonpayment and imposed a duty to use reason-
able care in sending notice thereof to the transferor, or alternatively,
in returning the item to the transferor in lieu of sending the notice.75
The Code provisions express the policy that each participant may
rely on the others to conduct themselves properly. U.C.C. section 4-
202(3) provides that a bank complying with its duties under subsec-
tion (1) of that section is not liable for the acts of another bank except
under subsection (1)(a). This exculpation includes the handling of the
72. Id. at 499.
73. Id.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
75. See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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item on its way to a payor bank and of the item or notices on the
return journey.
Thus, considering only U.C.C. section 4-201(1)(b), while the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York had actual knowledge of a non-
payment by State Bank of Albany, if it had given notice of that fact by
sending the item to its dejure transferor as a return item, it should not
have been responsible for any losses caused by the action of its trans-
feror. 76 The Code clearly intended to provide that each bank in the
chain of collection is not its brother's keeper.
An item sent for collection through a Federal Reserve Bank is
subject to the regulations of the Federal Reserve System. 77 Each Fed-
eral Reserve Bank deals only with banks in its own district. It carries
the reserve accounts of those banks only, except as specifically
arranged with other Federal Reserve Banks. Check collections oper-
ate by giving immediate provisional credit for cash items forwarded
for collection, subject to refund on a return "with entry. ' 78 In view of
the pressures to reduce the duration of bank holds, and to save a stop
on the item's journey to the payor bank, a Federal Reserve Bank may
give a bank in its district the privilege to send items directly to the
Federal Reserve Banks and processing centers in other Federal
Reserve cities, with the consent of each Federal Reserve Bank
involved, if the usual volume of items justifies the practice.7 9
Nevertheless, despite "direct send" privileges, the provisional
credits are set up so that the direct sender's provisional credit is with
the Federal Reserve Bank of its own district.80 Since return items are
76. Note, however, on the basis of the extensive discovery conducted after denial of the
motion to dismiss and the evidence submitted in connection with the motion for summary
judgment in U.S.F.&G. II, Judge Haight found that when the item was received as a return
item at Utica, it was "swapped" into a cash item letter and sent to the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia. This action indicates that it was to be presented for payment to First
Pennsylvania Bank, and treated as a normal "free" or "missent" item. See US.F.&G , 590 F.
Supp. at 490-91 (Judge Haight felt this might not be discoverable).
77. See 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1985) (the provisions of regulation J, which, in cases of conflict
with the Uniform Commercial Code, constitute "agreements otherwise" varying the effect of
Code provisions); U.C.C. § 4-103(2).
78. "With entry" or "without entry" are terms used to indicate whether or not the sender
is calling for any immediate entry into a mutual account in connection with the return item.
79. 12 C.F.R. § 210.4 (1985).
80. See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, OPERATING CIRCULAR No. 5,
COLLECTION OF CASH ITEMS 18, at 5-2 (revised February, 1982). The Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia's circular provides:
A sender that maintains or uses an account with us and that has cash items
payable in another District may send the items directly to the Reserve Office of
the District under procedures we prescribe. Under Section 210.4 of Regulation J,
items sent direct are deemed to have been handled by us. Senders that by
arrangement deliver cash items payable in other Districts to us or to another
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few in number and expensive to handle, the extra expense of a direct
return with a separate sending to reverse the provisional credits is
avoided by sending return items to the Federal Reserve Bank in
whose district the physical transferor was located. Thus, Judge
Haight decided that for purposes of U.C.C. section 4-202, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia was the de jure transferor of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York in US.F.& G.
Judge Haight correctly recognized this practice and concluded in
US. F & G. I that the return of the item to the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia did not constitute a lack of ordinary care. Since this
additional stop on the return journey is standard procedure, the
depositary hold periods should have been and probably were calcu-
lated with this in mind. Thus, in US.F. & G., the check deposited in
Baltimore on May 6th was sent back from State Bank of Albany on
May 9th and reached the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, via
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in time to be sent forward by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia on May 14th, the weekend
of the 10th and 11 th having intervened. Had the check been returned
to Philadelphia National Bank instead of being diverted by cash letter
to First Pennsylvania Bank, it is possible that Union Trust Company
would have received wire notice of the return in time to prevent the
May 15th withdrawal. No wire notice of nonpayment was required as
neither the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia nor Philadelphia
National Bank were originally alleged to have received a wire notice
of nonpayment."' On the other hand, if the correspondent relation-
ship between Philadelphia National and Union Trust Company
involved a custom of wiring notice of nonpayment, regardless of
whether a wire had been received, then Union Trust Company might
designated location for consolidated shipment should give us prior notice of any
deviation from that agreement.
Id. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York's operating circular provides:
We may permit or require a sender that maintains or uses an account with us and
that has a substantial volume or dollar amount of cash items payable in another
District, or in the territory of another office of this bank, to send the items
directly to the Reserve Office of that District or territory. We will give additional
instructions to a sender authorized to send direct. If we authorize a sender to
send items direct, we may refuse to accept these items from the sender. Under
section 210.4 of Regulation J, items sent direct under our authority are deemed
to have been handled by us.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, OPERATING CIRCULAR No. 4, COLLECTION OF
CASH ITEMS T 7, at 6 (revised Nov. 13, 1980).
81. 590 F. Supp. at 490-91. It is not clear whether State Bank of Albany sent wire notice
to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Under Regulation J and the relevant Operating
Circulars at that time, a Federal Reserve Bank not receiving a wire notice was under no
obligation to give one.
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have received notice on May 14th and could have blocked the
account.
After the motion to dismiss was denied, the parties conducted
extensive discovery. Based on this discovery, the Federal Reserve
Bank and other defendants filed motions for summary judgment.
They asserted that the actions of Union Trust, as it handled the
deposit of the check and permitted the withdrawal of the funds with-
out further investigation, despite having previously been told that the
check was drawn on a nonexistent account, barred any recovery. In
granting these motions, Judge Haight described Union Trust's con-
duct as "more than mere negligence, for it entailed acting in the face
of a known and obvious risk. Viewed in its entirety, Union Trust's
conduct was breathtakingly foolhardy; nay, commercially suicidal." 2
Judge Haight declined to assign liability to the depositary bank,
the first bank to refuse payment, or the "purported payor," on the
basis of who was best able to detect the fraud. Rather, the judge
turned to U.C.C. section 3-406, stating that he was "persuaded that it
[was] appropriate to apply its spirit by analogy to apportionment of
loss due to MICR fraud."8s3 He ruled that the record disclosed that
"the recklessness of Union Trust played a substantial-nay, indispen-
sible-role in the success of this fraud."'8 4 He granted summary judg-
ment to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, State Bank of
Albany, and Philadelphia National Bank.
Despite facts indicating that First Pennsylvania Bank had failed
to return the item within its midnight deadline, Judge Haight also
granted its motion for summary judgment. He ruled that U.C.C. sec-
tion 4-302 did not "shift the burden of loss to a payor bank which
misses its deadline if the payee was already aware when presenting the
check that it would not be accepted or paid except by mistake. '85
While the decision does not explicitly so state, this ruling must rest on
the preamble of U.C.C. section 4-302, which states that accountability
will exist only "[i]n the absence of a valid defense such as breach of a
presentment warranty (subsection 1 of section 4-207), settlement
effected or the like."86 Although Judge Haight is correct, the rule he
adopted is unfortunately not as well established as it should be. Judge
Haight implicitly ruled that learning that First Pennsylvania Bank
carried no account on which the check was drawn was analogous to
82. 620 F. Supp. at 368.
83. Id. at 372.
84. Id. at 373.
85. Id.
86. U.C.C. § 4-302.
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the other exceptions to the accountability rule under the phrase "or
the like."
Such defenses are beyond the scope of this article. We discuss
the allocation of loss in the case where the banks involved are not
reckless or "commercially suicidal." Judge Haight notes the problem
in his opinion in US.F. &G., stating: "If such fraud is carried out with
more sophistication than demonstrated by Goldstein [the depositor]
the deposit and collection of funds may escape the notice of even a
careful bank.""7
II. A SYSTEM-ORIENTED ANALYSIS OF MICR FRAUD
The purpose of this article is to show that if one takes an
approach to the issues in such cases which views the entire system of
bank collections as a superior biologist would view an ecological sys-
tem, 8 one could and should reach a result somewhat different from
the one reached in the recent MICR fraud cases. There are protective
measures available to prevent losses in situations involving what are
essentially diversions from the customary and reasonably anticipated
physical journey traversed by the vast majority of checks. These pro-
tective measures should be applied whether the situation involves
fraud or an honest error in check production because the purpose of
the hold procedure is to protect the system against the normal risk of
nonpayment of ordinary checks. In either case, the risk of a non-
recoverable withdrawal is present. If the situation involves a counter-
feit check, then the nonrecoverable withdrawal risk is practically a
certainty. If an honest error is involved, the bulk of the risks are still
present, but the diversion extends those risks for an unexpected longer
period of time. 9 The issue is whether the U.C.C. or Regulation J of
87. 620 F. Supp. at 371. In a telephone conversation with Professor Leary shortly after
the opinion in Northpark was published, Judge Knapp stated that, in addition to this case, in
criminal court settings he had tried five cases involving the same fraud.
88. This point was made by John Cairns, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Biology, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute, in an oral tribute delivered in Philadelphia to the distinguished biologist
Ruth Patrick Hodge. Professor Cairns stated, "Scientists capable of 'thinking systems' are
exceedingly rare. Most biologists both think and work at the species level and, although they
may talk about systems, rarely incorporate that level of biological organization into their
research." Leary & Fry, A "Systems" Approach to Payment Modes: Moving Toward A New
Payments Code, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 283 (1984) (citing Professor Cairns). Lawyers rarely do so
either. The authors suggest, however, that thinking "systems" is essential when dealing with
any rule of law relating to bank collections.
89. Usually only payor banks use the full midnight deadline. See U.C.C. § 4-104(l)(h)
(encompassing the balance of the day of receipt plus 24 hours of the next following banking
day). Assume a six day "out of state hold" and actual time in transit to a payor bank and back
of six days. A diversion to another bank for payment would add at least two more night-time
travels, plus another midnight deadline. The return would then arrive on day eight in the
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the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System now provides
for an appropriate warning, and if the answer is no, whether an
amendment is needed?
The authors believe that the underlying philosophy of the bank
collections provisions of the U.C.C. rest on several principles basic to
the system, all of which must be considered to determine, first, where
any new forms of loss should fall, and second, when the initial liability
should be shifted because preventive steps have not been taken.
A. Notice of Delay in Transit of Checks
The first principle is that each participant in the chain of collec-
tion must operate on the assumption that every other participant will
act properly. Statistically, due to the automated collection of checks
in bulk, all but a miniscule percentage of checks in the process of
collection are properly handled. In view of the desired speed in check
handling, this assumption should only be defeated by actual knowl-
edge to the contrary, either as to practices or procedures.
Whether an organization 9° has knowledge should be determined
in accordance with the Code's rules for determining notice to an
organization. Section 1-201(27) provides that the key for organiza-
tional knowledge is the knowledge of "the individual conducting the
transaction.""a In today's world this must be taken to mean the per-
son in charge of the machine that performs the transaction, and hav-
ing the organizational power to direct the manner in which it
operates. In the case of notice, a failure to act or to communicate
data can, in certain circumstances, result in liability.9 2 Similarly,
depending on like circumstances, a failure to reprogram where a
potential for harm exists should result in liability. Preventive meas-
ures requiring visual examinations, which would give knowledge and
thus trigger a duty to give notice, should only be required at a point
afternoon, rather than day six. The "system" would have permitted withdrawal on day seven
by the successful felon, who could thus serve his capacity for innocent enjoyment.
90. U.C.C. section 1-201(28) provides that "organization" includes a corporation,
government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or
association, two or more persons having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or
commercial entity. U.C.C. § 1-201(28).
91. U.C.C. § 1-201(27).
92. U.C.C. section 1-201(27) brings foreseeability of harm into play by making notice
effective not only when brought to the attention of the person conducting the transaction, but
also in any event when it should have been brought to his or her attention, by an organization
exercising due diligence. The second sentence provides guidelines for the determination of
"due diligence." These guidelines include a duty to communicate when the one having the
information has "reason to know" of both the transaction and that "the transaction would be
materially affected by the information." U.C.C. § 1-201(27).
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where the least number of checks would need to be examined; yet it
should be a point where an appropriately effective degree of preven-
tion could be obtained with any remaining losses affordably absorbed.
We suggest that only two points in the collection process should be
considered in MICR fraud cases.
The first point at which a visual examination might be required is
where the high speed reader-sorters reject the item as not machine
processable and the item itself cannot be made machine processable.93
Rejections constitute a small percentage of the total. In both of the
reported cases of MICR fraud, the entire MICR line was not printed
in magnetic ink and the item was rejected by the machines. The
figures were proper in Northpark but not machine readable. The
rejection was cured by placing the item in a "carrier" and encoding
figures in magnetic ink on the carrier's lower band.94 Had this been
attempted in the US.F. &. G. case, the court might have held that the
encoding bank had knowledge that the routing symbol was short one
digit and that the named bank was located in Philadelphia, the Third
Federal Reserve District's Reserve City, not in the Second Federal
Reserve District, as indicated by both the first four digits of the sec-
ond field and the routing fraction-particularly in light of the proxim-
ity of Baltimore and Philadelphia.
The other point at which a visual examination might be required
is in the return item process. But where in that process? A visual
inspection of the face of an item is necessary in order to divert it from
its return journey to the depositary bank, thus giving us the second
point. The visual inspection could occur at the first bank to which the
item was sent for payment. That bank might forward the item in a
low speed cash letter to the other possible payor bank, rather than
returning it to its transferor.9 The Code should classify this action as
causing a "delay in transit." This classification would be within the
spirit of U.C.C. section 4-202(l)(e), if not its letter. Under U.C.C.
section 4-202(1)(e), notice of such a delay would then be required.96
If, however, as in US.F. &G., the first bank receiving the item for
93. Ways to make the item machine processable include placing the item in a carrier or
adding an adhesive strip at the bottom. See supra note 47.
94. See supra text accompanying note 47.
95. The receiving bank might divert the item if it perceived the item to be a "missent
item." The term "missent item" refers to an item with a name and numbers pointing to Bank
B which somehow became part of a cash letter delivered for payment to Bank A. Clearing
houses have rules for "missent items." They are often routinely forwarded to another bank
without notice to the depositary bank.
96. See U.C.C. § 4-202(l)(e). As presently worded, the section appears to require the
notice to go to the bank's transferor. U.C.C. section 4-202(l)(b) provides for direct returns to
the depositary bank. Subsection (e) should do the same.
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payment returns the item to its transferor and that transferor, or
another intermediary bank, extends the return journey by sending the
item to another potential payor, that action constitutes a delay of the
return journey. The diverting bank has knowledge of the delay
obtained from its own action. The negative notice of payment in the
cash item collection ecosystem requires that a notice of the delay be
given to the depositary bank. The reason for this is not that there is a
badge of fraud or the like. The reason is that the funds-availability
system is based on a failure to receive notice of dishonor or nonpay-
ment within a time frame measured by a transit period to one bank
and back. Even if the item is properly drawn on the second bank, the
time during which the depositary bank is subject to risks of nonpay-
ment has been extended without its knowledge.
Of the two points-initial rejection by high speed processors, and
what we may call the diversion point-we believe the diversion point
should be, and on a systems approach must be, selected as the place
where notice of delay in transit should be initiated. Reasons for this
will be set forth at a later point. But how should the notice be given?
The wire notice provisions of the Federal Reserve System, as
presently drafted, do not suffice. They apply only to payor banks. As
set forth in the operating letters or circulars of the several Federal
Reserve Banks, these rules did not, prior to October 1, 1985, require
the Reserve Banks to do more than forward by wire any notices
received by wire. 97
As to whether U.C.C. section 4-202(l)(b) required the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York to do more than return the item to the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Judge Haight stated in
U.S.F.& G. I: "Section 4-202(1) of the U.C.C., which requires ordi-
nary care in notifying downstream banks of dishonor, is best inter-
preted as requiring a bank to send notice of dishonor reasonably
calculated to reach the depositary bank in time to prevent a with-
drawal against a dishonored check." 98 He then said that if it was rea-
sonably foreseeable that the check would be diverted from its return
to the depositary and rejected by another bank, "New York Fed failed
to use ordinary care in routing the check to Philadelphia Fed without
taking some precaution to avoid the foreseeable risks. Because it
apparently sent no other notice of dishonor to Union Trust, it would
97. U.S.F.& G, 590 F. Supp. at 493. See also FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK,
OPERATING CIRCULARS Nos. 4 & 6, 20 & 23 (revised Sept. 18, 1979).
98. 590 F. Supp. at 497-98. We note that the Second Circuit in its memorandum
affirmance (supra note 55) referred with approval to U.S.F.&G I. This is unfortunate as the
discussion of foreseeability is not applicable.
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have failed in its duty of ordinary care under § 4-202.""9
Judge Haight's statements are supported by an extensive footnote
which displays a fundamental misconception as to the coverage of the
Code. The footnote contains the statement:
As New York Federal points out, returning the check does provide
notice, since the check is generally stamped "unpaid" by the
dishonoring bank. However, because returning the dishonored
check is a nearly universal practice within the industry, a fact
which must have been known to the drafting committee, New
York Fed's argument raises the question of why the alternative
requirement of sending notice was included at all. Plainly the
drafting committee did not intend both notice and return in all
cases, since it made the provision disjunctive. However, by includ-
ing the separate provisions for notice it seemed to indicate recogni-
tion that the standard practice of returning a check, which does
provide notice, would not always suffice. The reference to notice is
otherwise essentially redundant."°
With respect, the footnote indicates that the learned judge over-
looked the fact that, in its final form, U.C.C. section 4-202 covered all
types of items, including "cash items" as well as "collection items."
It also covered notice of dishonor, notice of nonpayment, and
returning the item.101 Placing the three actions in the alternative, as
the Code did, indicates that only one need be done. Despite the sensi-
tivity to the needs of the collection system elsewhere reflected in his
rulings, we submit that in this case the judge overlooked the need to
consider that system, in which the provisional credit had to be
reversed, and that a return of the item itself was required as a voucher
to do this.° 2 If, on the other hand, the item was a demand item being
held for protest by a payor bank, as section 4-301(1)(b) provides, only
99. Id. at 498.
100. Id. at n.20.
101. See supra note 61. The judge overlooked the fact that these were all permissible
alternatives for the sender, often a payor bank of a noncash item. U.C.C. section 4-301(1)(b)
lists only one limited alternative to returning the item, if it is a cash item. Section 4-202 must
cover a collecting bank which presents a noncash item to a nonbank payor, as well as cash
items. Even if the noncash item is something other than a documentary draft, common sense
would dictate that the item might be retained to see if ultimate payment could be secured. The
drafting decision that rules must cover both cash items and noncash items mandated a listing
of what might be required in the alternative. See U.C.C. § 4-202.
102. The use of the second alternative in U.C.C. section 4-301(l)(b) is indeed limited. The
payor bank must return the item itself, or may send written notice if "the item is held for
protest or is otherwise unavailable for return." U.C.C. § 4-301(1)(b). The term "otherwise
unavailable for return" has not yet received judicial interpretation. Cf. United States v.
Loskocinski, 403 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (grand jury subpoena vacated because penalty
for not returning item too severe to force bank to assume risk that New York courts might not
consider subpoena sufficient to make item "otherwise unavailable").
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a notice could be sent in respect of a "cash item." Since section 4-
301(1)(b) is in part three of article four, the part relating to payor
banks, the drafters did not feel it was necessary to state fully, in the
exception in section 4-202, what collecting banks should do about
returning notices or items where "demand items other than documen-
tary drafts are concerned." The demand documentary draft was
excepted from the return requirement since part five of article four,
relating to documentary drafts, requires retention by the last present-
ing bank where a nonbank payor is involved. 0 3 Section 4-202 also
covers time items and other items not customarily returned.
The learned judge's approach would have the drafters write into
each section where alternative actions are listed additional words indi-
cating that any alternative suffices for all others named. That was not
the drafting style, which was, rather, to indicate when alternatives
were not co-equal, as in U.C.C. section 4-301(1). Further, a systems
approach would not require this. In the case of cash items, this
approach is contrary to the principle that in the absence of actual
knowledge a bank is entitled to assume that other banks have per-
formed correctly.
The court's approach in US.F& G. also overlooks the fact that
grammatically the duty to use ordinary care governs the "sending"
and not what is to be sent. The "[s]ubject to subsection (1)(a)" lan-
guage in subsection three indicates when "ordinary care" relates to
the actions, or foreseeable actions, of the person to whom something
is sent. The continued use of "foreseeable" in Judge Haight's formu-
lations also overlooks the actual knowledge content of the conditions
precedent in U.C.C. section 4-202(l)(b) as well as in U.C.C. section 4-
202(l)(e). Furthermore, the hold periods differ from depositary bank
to depositary bank, so that there is no way, for example, that the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York could have had any knowledge of the
actual length of Union Bank's hold period for any particular item.
Finally, Judge Haight's requirement of some form of notice in addi-
tion to the required return of the item itself would apply to every
collecting bank in every chain of collection, unduly enlarging the
number of notices and the costs of operating the system.
If the penalty for not giving a notice of the extension of the total
transit time from the start of the collection process to its finish back at
the depositary bank is to be the damage caused by the failure to send
the notice, and the principle of placing liability for misdeeds upon the
wrongful actor is to be used, then the onus should be placed on the
103. U.C.C. § 4-503. Note that the presenting bank must also originate and send a notice of
dishonor in the case of all "on arrival" drafts. U.C.C. § 4-502.
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bank initiating the diversion from the customary return journey. °4
Collecting banks should not be required to make a detailed examina-
tion of all return items under a foreseeability test.
By considering every dispatch in the "return item" channel as a
return to the depositary bank, we avoid two awkward decisions. The
first is determining the status of a bank, as payor or collecting bank,
to which an item is missent for payment by reason of the numerals on
the item. The second is that we avoid Judge Haight's worry in
U.S.F. & G. I about how to prove the intent with which, for example,
New York Fed returned the item to the Federal Reserve Bank of Phil-
adelphia. °5 The intent should not be relevant. Return to a trans-
feror, or directly to the depositary bank, should be a proper action in
all circumstances. The issue should be resolved by considering all
such returns as proper in the absence of proof of specific instructions
directing, or specific action creating a diversion from the journey to
one bank and back.
By a proper interpretation of U.C.C. section 4-202(1)(e), liability
would be placed on the bank diverting the return from the normal
route back to the depositary bank. The diverting bank, by its own
actions, will have actual knowledge that the transit from depositary
bank to one bank, thought to be a payor bank, and back has been
delayed'016 by the transit to the second bank for payment and back.
This places the burden for giving notice of delay on the first bank to
have actual knowledge of the delay. No jury or other trier of fact has
to speculate on the foreseeability of a future diversion by a bank to
which a return item is routinely sent. The basic principle of placing
104. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
105. 590 F. Supp. at 497. Of course, if the item is "swapped" from a return item letter to a
forwarding cash item letter (see supra note 76), the purpose of the return is clearly stated. The
knowledge thus acquired is that any ultimate return for nonpayment is delayed.
106. Under this principle, the bank with actual knowledge that it is making a diversion
bears the burden of initiating and forwarding a notice. Unlike a payor bank simply returning
an item, it takes deliberate action to send the item on a journey different from the one it would
normally follow. If that bank is a collecting bank, it also knows that the item has already been
presented to one bank for payment.
A problem arises in the case of items innocently missent but having a single payor. In this
case, possibly the resulting loss should be placed on the sending bank that misdirected the
item. In any revision of the language of U.C.C. section 4-202, it might be advisable to attempt
a distinction between diversions and "missends." Any distinction, however, would require a
human inspection of the item; but this would occur only after the missending is discovered.
We conclude that the notice requirement should apply to missent items as well as diverted
items, as the same risks exist and, in both situations, the duration of the risks is extended.
Banks capable of distinguishing between MICR fraud and missending might prefer, due
to the percentage of checks that are ultimately honored, to omit the notice of delay in the case
of missent items and absorb any losses not recoverable from the missending bank. If
negligence on the part of the missending bank is shown, the losses should fall on that bank.
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liability on a bank only for its own actions, not for the actions of
another bank, is preserved.
A bank sending an item on a diversion from the standard journey
to one payor bank and back should divert at its peril, unless it gives
the depositary bank due notice of the diversion to enable the deposi-
tary bank to extend its hold pending the expiration of an additional
time period.
B. Defenses to Liability for Failure to Give Notice
We have suggested that a notice of diversion given by any bank
diverting an unpaid item from its return journey to the depositary
bank is one way to prevent MICR fraud. There is another point in
the system where clumsy MICR frauds could be checked. This point
is at the depositary bank, either when the item is first deposited or
when the item is rejected by its MICR sorters. The items in both of
the recently reported cases were not printed in magnetic ink on the
so-called MICR line. In Northpark, the MICR line was otherwise in
order, except that it indicated Bankers Trust Company of New York
as the payor bank, while the printed name and fractional routing
number indicated a different Federal Reserve District. Where clerks
handle rejected items, it should not unduly delay processing opera-
tions to train them to note whether the denominator of the routing
fraction and the first four digits of the routing numbers in the first
field of the MICR line indicate the same district, 107 and to refer the
item to supervisors when they do not. Similarly, it would not con-
sume much time to have clerks note whether the routing symbol con-
tains nine digits. 108 It would not take long, however, for those
planning a MICR fraud to be sure not to be caught by these tests.
These tests, therefore, do not satisfy our requirements for a systems-
oriented, cost-effective device to discourage losses through MICR
fraud. Mandating action by the depositary bank would be ineffective
and therefore such action should not be required.
The better solution is to require notice of diversion, and to give
any bank that fails to give such notice a defense of gross contributory
negligence, where such negligence can be shown.° 9 This defense was
107. See supra note 41.
108. Id.
109. Because the policy underlying our proposal is that the bank which diverts the item is in
the best and most cost-effective position to prevent the loss, liability for the loss should be
shifted away from that bank when it can be shown that, in fact, another bank had and failed to
take advantage of an opportunity to prevent the loss. See Leary & Fry, A "Systems" Approach
to Payment Modes: Moving Toward a New Payments Code, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 283, 289-91 (1984).
As Judge Haight noted in his ruling on summary judgment, section 3-406, in a similar fashion,
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raised in U.S.F & G. 11 after discovery was completed and was suc-
cessful. As Judge Haight found in the order granting summary judg-
ment, no hold was placed on withdrawals despite the size of the
check, which had been deposited in a branch that was not the branch
at which the account was domiciled. Curiously, when the "home"
branch noticed the large deposit, its employees determined that the
item was drawn on the First Pennsylvania Bank by having a micro-
film copy put on a screen and read to them. They made a telephone
inquiry to First Pennsylvania prior to any withdrawal. The inquiry
elicited the fact that First Pennsylvania had no account for the
drawee named on the check.'1
Nothing was done with this information. When the malefactor
requested a wire transfer of $660,000 and a cash withdrawal of
$95,000, the computer showed the full $881,000 plus as available
funds. Both requests were honored shortly after they were made,
despite the apparently unresolved "suspicion." Shortly thereafter the
telephone notice of nonpayment was received. The conduct of the
depositary bank seems, at the least, to have been negligent."' An
additional defense would be that the failure to give notice, or delay in
giving the notice, did not cause the loss because the notice, even if
timely given, could not have reached the depositary bank prior to the
time the bank allowed the withdrawals." 12
U.C.C. section 4-103(5), however, presents a bit of a problem. It
specifies that the measure of damages "for failure to exercise ordinary
care.., is the amount of the item reduced by an amount which could
not have been realized by the use of ordinary care.""' 3 In MICR
fraud cases, this would result in no recovery at all because even with
shifts forgery losses from the bank to the customer when the customer's negligence enables the
forgery to occur. 620 F. Supp. at 371-73. See infra note 113 for a discussion of missent but
honest items.
110. 620 F. Supp. at 364. In addition, the branch manager requested credit reports on the
business which Goldstein, the depositor, stated he represented. Both of the services contacted
reported they had no record of such a business.
111. The depositary bank's negligence formed the basis for Judge Haight's decision to grant
summary judgment to the various defendants. 620 F. Supp. at 371-73.
112. U.C.C. section 4-103(5) reduces damages by the "amount which could not have been
realized by the use of ordinary care." Cf. Wells Fargo Bank v. Hartford Nat'l Bank, 484 F.
Supp. 817 (D. Conn. 1980).
113. U.C.C. § 4-103(5). Section 4-103(5) provides that "[t]he measure of damages for
failure to exercise ordinary care in handling an item is the amount of the item reduced by an
amount which could not have been realized by the use of ordinary care ... ." Id.
If the diverted item is genuine and was either missent or contained a printer's error, and is
ultimately honored by a payor, the losses caused by any failure to give notice of diversion
would be minor. In fact, they would only amount to the value of the use of the funds for the
period of any extended hold that would have been imposed-reduced, of course, by any
interest payable to the customer for that period. Where large items are involved, a revised
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ordinary care, no funds would have been received on a completely
bogus check. This section must be treated as placing the amount of
the item as a top limit, and permitting recovery, in conjunction with
U.C.C. section 1-103 and the final sentence of comment six to U.C.C.
section 4-103, of loss caused by a complete failure to perform the des-
ignated duty as well as loss caused by any negligence in the perform-
ance of that duty. This is consistent with the result reached in certain
cases 1 14 where a bank failed to wire notice of nonpayment under Fed-
eral Reserve rules in existence before the recent amendment imposing
sanctions. Those cases held that the depositary bank was entitled to
recover the amount of disbursements that would not have been made
had the wire notice been timely given.
When the drafters of the Code adopted the negative notice of
payment approach and eliminated any duty to trace, 1 5 they could not
have knowingly intended to rule that all losses caused by completely
bogus checks should fall on the depositary bank even though it
received no notice of a diversion of the return journey or of a delay in
any aspect of the journey. A system based on funds availability
requires that banks that rely without negligence on the system be
reimbursed for losses, up to the face amount of the item, whether
bogus or merely uncollectible. They should be reimbursed whenever
the negligence or failure of an intermediary or payor bank causes the
depositary bank to act as if payment had been received after no notice
was received in a normal time.
These protections are not needed where the collection is not in
the cash item-provisional credit channel. That channel is the only
collection channel where payment is, by lapse of time, finalized.
Where items are sent for remittance, as is paper that bankers call
either "collection items" or "non-cash items," the issue does not arise.
Failure to receive a remittance indicates nonpayment and tracing does
occur. 1 16
article four could provide for a notice of diversion to protect against the extension of the
normal risks of nonpayment.
114. See, e.g., Empire Nat'l Bank v. Chester Nat'l Bank, 66 Misc. 2d 422, 320 N.Y.S.2d 705
(Sup. Ct. 1971). But see Mulford, The Federal Reserve's "Wire Advice of Nonpayment," 100
BANKING L.J. 622, 629-31 (1983) (collection of cases).
115. See U.C.C. § 4-212 & comment 1.
116. The "collection item" process, as distinguished from the "cash item" process, usually
involves a "discount" of the item by the depositary bank, often with a reserve amount withheld
to cover "bad" items. The depositary bank sends the item in a "collection letter" requesting a
remittance. Absent a special request, for example, for New York, Chicago, or Atlanta funds,
or perhaps "federal funds," the remittance is by a cashier's check of the presenting or payor
bank. This is sent after that bank ascertains the desires of the customer (i.e., drawer or
account party) as to payment, and ascertains the adequacy of funds in the account. Often, if
there are not sufficient funds, the bank at the end of the collection chain will hold the item for
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C. The Demand for Prompt Funds Availability
In a systems view, one must consider another force with which
the system must contend: pressure from many sources for earlier
availability of funds. While shortening the total journey might have a
dampening effect on a felon's ability to commit MICR fraud, any
availability statutes not keyed to normal journeys could increase the
incidence of such frauds.
Delayed availability can result from several causes. The first is
the actual journey time to payor bank and back, including processing
times at depositary, intermediary, and payor banks."I7 The second is
a theoretical journey time, which assumes each bank will use the full
midnight deadline period before forwarding the item to the next bank
but physical transport time will occur only during the night."' The
several days. See Memphis Aero Corp. v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 647 S.W.2d 219 (Tenn. 1983).
The collection letters are usually multicarbon forms, kept in a dated "tickler file." One of
the carbons is a "tracer" letter. Nonpayment is signalled by the failure to receive a remittance
check, and, after a few days, the tracer will be dispatched. Since "payment" is signalled by
receipt of the remittance instrument, there is no need for a U.C.C. section 4-302(a)
accountability rule, except where the item is "properly payable" and a remittance is not sent.
If the customer has directed nonpayment, the item becomes one that is not "properly
payable."
Article 4 incorrectly fails to distinguish between the "clean draft" sent by a collection
letter, and the check or other cash item moving with a simultaneous flow of provisional credits.
"Demand item other than documentary draft" is not felicitous language.
117. The journey of the item in U.S.F. & G. serves as a useful model. That journey included
the following steps:
1. Deposit on May 6, 1980.
2. Receipt by Philadelphia National Bank via Purolator Courier at 2:41
a.m., May 7, 1980.
3. The Utica Regional Processing Center received the item directly from
Philadelphia National either late in the evening on May 7, 1980 or early May 8,
1980.
4. The item was sent to Albany State Bank on May 8, 1980 and arrived
between 9:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. on Friday, May 9, 1980.
5. Saturday and Sunday (10th and 1 th) intervening, State Bank of Albany
returned the check, stamped "Sent in Error," to the Utica Regional Processing
Center on the evening of May 12, 1980.
6. On May 13, 1980, Utica Regional Processing Center sent the check to the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
7. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia received the check and presented it
to First Penn. on May 14th.
620 F. Supp. at 363-68; 590 F. Supp. at 490-91.
Had the item not been diverted to First Penn., it would have gone to Philadelphia
National Bank from Philadelphia Fed. The Union Trust of Baltimore would have received it
in the early morning of May 15, and might have known of the dishonor late on May 14, in time
to charge back the provisional credit before the opening of business on May 16, the date of the
withdrawal. If this had been done, in six or seven banking days or eight or ten calendar days
the item would have been handled by eight banking locations on different days, but only one,
State Bank of Albany, would have used the full midnight deadline.
118. See supra note 117. If each bank had used its full midnight deadline, seven more
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third is a hold planned to be longer than necessary, which is placed,
some claim, to permit use of the collected funds by the depositary
bank for a longer period than necessary but could be a "hedge"
against delay in the mails." 9
Some believe that many of the holds now in use are of the third
type, namely, that they are placed to extend the "float" period. This
belief has resulted in pressure for funds availability legislation, which
has been passed, as a result, in Delaware, California, Illinois, and
New York. 120 Because the banks use the negative notice system for
checks, there is a need for holds on the provisional credits. Abuses
only exist when the hold period exceeds the period necessary to learn
of any nonpayment.
Over the years, there have been several efforts to reduce the nec-
essary hold periods and the customers' lost opportunity costs result-
ing from long hold periods. The first effort is reflected in the U.C.C.
as optional section 4-212(2).' At the suggestion of James Kennedy,
Operations Vice President of the Philadelphia National Bank, the
concept of "direct returns" was incorporated in section 4-212(2) at a
time when there was no MICR line or automation. Kennedy thought
that the check being returned could be slipped into an envelope draft
drawn on the depositary bank by the returning payor bank and
included in outgoing cash letters. The check would thus not have to
retrace the precise journey that it travelled on the way from the
depositary bank to the payor bank. The payor's books would let the
banking days would have been consumed, and, due to two more intervening weekends, the
item would not have been returned until May 25th, for a total of 15 banking days or 21
calendar days.
119. See supra notes 117-18. See also Wells Fargo Bank v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 484 F. Supp. 817 (D. Conn. 1980). In Wells Fargo, a check drawn on the Reno branch of
a Nevada bank was deposited in New York on November 22. It reached Los Angeles on
November 23, but, sending it by mail from there to Reno took sixteen days. The return item
reached the depository bank on December 27, a total of thirty-five days; yet each bank
handling the item acted in a timely fashion. Id. at 818-20. As between banks in major banking
areas, presentment can occur on a next day basis through the use of courier services where
there is a substantial volume of items to transfer. For a table of "hold" periods see supra note
19. The out of state holds can be criticized as too long where metropolitan areas are involved.
Where rural or "up-state" payor banks are involved, however, they are perhaps not too long,
particularly if placed on a worst case basis.
120. CAL. FIN. CODE § 866-866.9 (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 937 (Supp.
1984); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-d (McKinney Supp. 1984). A new Illinois statute, enrolled
effective July 1, 1986, amends U.C.C. section 4-213 by adding a new subsection (5), which sets
fixed numbers of days for funds availability. ILL. S.B. 525, § 4 (1986). See also Jordan, supra
note 19. (proposals to amend Article IV of the U.C.C. to limit bank's wide discretion in
determining when customers are permitted to withdraw deposited funds).
121. Subsection 4-212(2) has been adopted in all but a handful of jurisdictions, namely
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. California
adopted the subsection in 1983, effective January 1, 1984. See 1983 CAL. STAT. 1011.
[Vol. 40:737
MICR FRAUD
provisional credit given for the item stand and be "washed to zero" by
the credit received for the cash letter containing the return item. The
depositary bank's credit received for its sending would "wash" the
payment for the envelope draft. The depositary bank would then
charge that sum back to its customer just as if its provisional credit
had been revoked.I22 This concept has not yet been implemented
except in a pilot program in the Dallas Federal Reserve Region. 123
The only time-saving would be due to the use of the fast transit means
used for cash letters, rather than the slower United States mails often
used for return items. The item would still require manual process-
ing, as do all return items today, unless placed in an envelope draft or
carrier encoded for fast sorting. 124
A second effort to reduce hold periods focused on the use of a
"wirefate" collection instruction for large items.125 It was abandoned
as too expensive. Presently, all Federal Reserve Operating Circulars
122. Some have argued against direct returns as requiring each bank to deal with 14,500
other banks. The fate of the fight over direct sending to a payor bank is instructive. See 2
PATON'S DIGEST §§ 17:21-17:24 (1942). As of 1941, 18 states had adopted the Bank
Collection Code, which provided for direct sending in section six; 21 states had adopted the
American Banker's Association's "Forwarding Direct to Payor Act," but four of these states
later adopted the Bank Collection Code. Six other states had their own collection codes.
Federal Reserve Regulations and Operating Circulars also so provided. The explanatory note
to section six of the Bank Collection Code stated: "Custom has sanctioned the practice of
forwarding direct to the drawee or payor bank, contrary to the judicial rule that such method
of forwarding is negligence .... " 2 PATON'S DIGEST 1377. No one in the states enacting the
American Banker's Association's "Forwarding Check Direct to Payor Act" appears to have
thought for a moment that a depositary bank sending through correspondents was not
protected by the Act. Any claim that direct returns cannot go through correspondents is
equally incorrect.
123. Presentation by Governor Gramley, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Bank Administration Institute 1985 Check Processing Conference, Dearborn,
Michigan (March 27, 1985)(photocopy on file in the office of the University of Miami Law
Review).
124. The Dallas Direct Return Project uses the courier system of the Federal Reserve Bank,
which greatly speeds returns. The sorting of return items for forwarding, however, continues
to be manual.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas describes the "Return Item Pilot Programs" as
having four elements: (1) processing of all returns by the Fed even if the item did not go
through the Fed for presentment; (2) sorting and delivering these items to the financial
institutions of first deposit; (3) providing notification of nonpayment on all large returns to the
financial institutions of first deposit; and (4) charging a fee to the payor institution. FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, OPERATING CIRCULAR No. 83-9 (Jan. 13, 1983).
125. See 2 PATON'S DIGEST 1278 (1942) ("An agent collecting bank is under a duty to
follow all instructions in undertaking collection, and would be liable for any loss caused by its
failure to wire advice of nonpayment as instructed."); see also O'Neil v. First Nat'l Bank of
Lovelock, 15 F. Supp. 133, 138 (D. Nev. 1936) (involving bank's instruction to wire
nonpayment of items for $500.00 or over). In 1947, Professor Leary found that these
instructions, and instructions stating "Wire Fate," were prevalent. Due to the current speed
and to the standard "Wire Notice" instructions in all Federal Reserve Banks' Operating
Circulars, their use seems to have declined.
1986]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:737
contain uniform provisions requiring a wire notification of nonpay-
ment of large items, now defined as $2,500 and over. 1216  Federal
Reserve Banks forward notices received by them from payor banks by
wire. 12  Studies show that the requirement of wire notice, defined to
include a telephone call, was honored in the breach at least fifty-two
percent of the time.'2  The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System has recently adopted an amendment to its Regulation
J, which was designed to put some teeth into the requirement that
payor banks wire notice of nonpayment. A failure to wire notice ren-
ders the bank liable for any loss incurred by the depositary bank.
129
A third effort to reduce hold periods is reflected in the state legis-
lation on funds availability. These state laws address two problems.
First, customer (usually consumer customer) awareness of the length
of holds; banks must issue descriptive statements of their hold poli-
cies. The Delaware statute goes no further. 3 ° Second, the state laws
address the length of the holds that the bank may impose. New York
and California provide for administrative statements of reasonable
times for holds.' The regulations, however, merely adopt a same
city, same state, and other state approach, excluding out of country
126. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 210.6(a) n.3 (1980) (current version 12 C.F.R. § 210.6(a)(2)
(1986)).
127. Id.
128. Mulford, The Federal Reserve's "Wire Advice of Nonpayment", 100 BANKING L.J. 622,
631 (1983). The author's conclusion is of interest:
Check law contains a number of ambiguities that seem to invite litigation. When
does the midnight deadline run when a paying bank uses off-premises facilities
for processing? Does the midnight deadline apply at all on second presentment?
When is a paying bank excused from a failure to meet the midnight deadline? It
is because of these uncertainties that the Federal Reserve Banks resolutely refuse
to inspect checks for timeliness of return.
Id. at 632-33 (citations omitted).
129. 50 Fed. Reg. 5740-41 (1985) (revising 12 C.F.R. § 210.12). New subparagraph (c)(6),
effective October 1, 1985, provides:
A paying bank that fails to exercise ordinary care in meeting the requirements of
this paragraph shall be liable to the depositary bank for losses incurred by the
depositary bank, up to the amount of the item, reduced by the amount of the loss
that the depositary bank would have incurred even if the paying bank had used
ordinary care. A paying bank that fails to act in good faith in meeting the
requirements of this paragraph may be liable for other damages, if any, suffered
by the depositary bank as a proximate consequence. If the paying bank or the
depositary bank prevail in litigation involving the requirements of this paragragh,
it may recover its court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. A paying bank shall
not be liable for mistake, neglect, negligence, misconduct, insolvency or default
of any other bank or other person in connection with providing notice under this
paragraph.
Id. at 5740.
130. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 937 (Supp. 1984).
131. CAL. FIN. CODE § 866; N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-d.
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items and make no provision for extending holds upon receipt of
notice of delay in transit. The recent Illinois legislation goes into
greater detail based on the type of drawer involved. 13 2
Check truncation, called by the bankers "check safe-keeping,' 33
would, if practiced by the bank of first deposit, collect funds by wiring
the MICR line through the system of Automated Clearing Houses to
the payor bank. This method would mitigate two problems: funds
availability and MICR fraud. The procedure is as follows. The bank
of deposit wires the three fields of the MICR line to the payor bank.
Each sending has a trace number so that if the trace number of the
first sender is included in the subsequent messages, a reply rejecting
payment could use that trace number as a depositary bank identifier.
Hence the problem of determining the depositary bank from endorse-
ments on the reverse of the item is eliminated. Practically all of the
time consumed in moving paper from one institution to another and
in sorting for further sending would also be eliminated. For this
method to be truly effective for mass processing, however, the infor-
mation in the MICR line would have to control any words or num-
bers written on the item.' 34
Another method, which has not been tried, would be to use
U.C.C. section 4-206,"'1 so that only the depositary bank's indorse-
ment appears on the reverse side of the item. The cash letter could
constitute the indorsement of the intermediary bank. 3 6 The deposi-
tary bank's indorsement stamp could then be enlarged to set forth its
132. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, R. 10.190406(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1984); ILL. S.B. 525, supra
note 120, N.Y. GEN'L REGS. OF THE BANKING BOARD, §§ 34.1-34.5 (1983).
133. See Leary & High, The Place of EFT and Check Truncation in Corporate Payment
Systems, 5 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2 n.7, 28 (1980). The first bank having the capacity transmits
the MICR line electronically to the payor bank and maintains the item for 90 days subject to
retrieval on request. A microfilm print is available thereafter. The payor bank gives
provisional credit on the day of receipt, subject to cancellation by a wire notice sent within the
midnight deadline. The bankers call this system "Check Safe Keeping."
134. U.C.C. section 3-118(c) (adopting the rule that words control figures, should be
amended). Regulation J of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which
permits Federal Reserve Banks to "go by the numbers," is a step in the right direction. See 12
C.F.R. § 210.6(2)(a). Encoding machine operators always encode from the numbers. If these
are misencoded, any loss must, of necessity, be borne by the misencoder.
135. U.C.C. section 4-206 provides that "any agreed method which identifies the transferor
bank is sufficient for the item's further transfer to another bank." U.C.C. § 4-206.
136. This might run afoul of U.C.C. § 3-202(2) which provides that "[a]n indorsement must
be written by or on behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed
thereto as to become a part thereof." It would, however, alleviate the substantial problems
presently experienced by the collection system as a result of illegible indorsements or
indorsements obliterated by subsequent indorsement stamps superimposed by collecting banks
later in the chain. For a discussion of the indorsement problem, see Supplementary
Information to Amendment, 50 Fed. Reg. 5734 (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 210) (1985).
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routing number. Return items could be placed either in carriers or
have a full white strip attached along the bottom. In either case, the
MICR line would show the amount of the check. 3 7 The depositary
bank could then determine the account to be charged, as it now does
with return items.
III. Is AMENDMENT THE ONLY CURE?
We have analyzed the issues in MICR fraud that we feel are most
significant. We have given our preferred solution in light of the oper-
ation of the system. We now address a third question: Can the
desired result be achieved by interpretation or is amendment
necessary?
A. U.C.C Section 4-202(1)(e)
A requirement that the diverting bank give notice, if asserted
other than in federal courts in the Second Circuit could be successful,
especially if a systems approach to interpretation were taken. With
respect, we again suggest that Judge Knapp erred in limiting the word
"transit" to the several disparate physical movements of paper
between banks without regard to any increase in the number of such
movements. 138 Judge Haight's acceptance of Judge Knapp's reading
can be taken as approved because U.S.F. &G I was cited by the Court
of Appeals in its memorandum affirmance.' 39 We believe that a per-
son, package, or check should be considered "in transit" from start to
finish of the intended journey, despite waiting periods at different
places along the way. For example, when a person leaves a train and
waits for a ferry to complete the journey, the person is still considered
"in transit" to the ultimate destination.
Judge Knapp correctly summarized the check collection system,
but failed to apply a systems approach to the delay in transit. He
properly identified the two important features of the system. He
wrote:
The first is that, notwithstanding the colloquial suggestion to the
contrary, checks deposited for collection do not generally "clear."
Thus the hallmark of the normal completion of collection-i.e. the
137. For criticism of the time-consuming and error-prone system presently used for return
items, see Jordan, supra note 19, at 531-33; Mulford, supra note 128, at 623.
138. See supra note 62.
139. US.F.& G., 590 F. Supp. 486, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aft'd mem. - F.2d - (2d Cir.
Mar. 14, 1986) (stating that the result was correct). Any attempt at a different interpretation
in a district court will have hard sledding.
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check having been paid-is the receipt of no notice by the deposi-
tary institution.
The second important feature is that the collection process has
been, of course, automated by the use of check sorting
computers. 140
The Northpark opinion recognizes that banks customarily place holds
on the provisional credits automatically given for deposited items to
allow time for the unpaid item or notice of its nonpayment to arrive,
lest the bank make an unintended loan to its customer. An inference
which arises from automation, of course, is that checks in the process
of collection or return are visually examined for only three purposes,
namely, for routing, to determine if a reason for nonpayment is stated,
and for accounting purposes to determine the amount.
Trouble arrives when, as in U.S.F & G., the check is returned
with the stamp "Sent in Error." In that case, a bank has two choices.
One alternative is to continue the item on its return journey to the
bank's transferor; the other is to send it to what it considers to be the
proper payor bank. But where the second alternative is adopted, the
bank which makes that choice should recognize that the system is not
geared to handle the extended period of time caused by a diversion of
the return journey to a second bank for payment. A system where no
notice of payment is given should provide for some notice of the addi-
tional time required when items are sent to a second bank for
payment.
Judge Knapp found it significant that both the April and July
1948 versions of the bank collection materials used the word "transit"
in connection with a comment referring to delay in the mails.' 4' That
comment was not included in the final Code. These drafts contained a
provision imposing full liability on a collecting bank for "any loss
caused by delay in transit or failure of such item to arrive." '42 The
comments pointed out that this result would effect a considerable
change in prior law which had, by case law, the Bank Collection
Code, and deposit agreement, placed the risk of loss due to the mail or
other delay on the depositor. ' 43 The comment referred to the case law
"duty to trace" and suggested that periodic reconciliation of mutual
140. Northpark, 572 F. Supp. at 525-26 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 531.
142. ALI-NCCUSL, U.C.C. § 3-713 (1948) (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, July 30, 1948).
143. ALI-NCCUSL, Notes and Comments to Part VII of U.C.C. Proposed Final Draft No.
2 (Aug. 2, 1948) [hereinafter cited as August Comments to Draft No. 2]; Commercial Code
(Group No. 1) Notes and Comments to Part VII Proposed Final Draft No. 2 - Article III,
August 2, 1948, p. 17. The relevant text reads:
Section 713. Loss of Cash Item in Transit. A collecting bank forwarding a cash
item to another bank is liable to all prior parties for any loss caused by delay in
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accounts between the sending and the destination bank would disclose
the failure to arrive, or a delay in arrival.
The same drafts provided that each bank, in the case of cash
items, was liable for the negligence of the immediate next correspon-
dent selected by it, thus adopting the New York rule for such items.
The general duties of collecting banks as to cash items were set forth
in section 712 of the April 1948 Draft Number One and in section 708
of the July 1948 Draft Number Two. The latter draft reduced the
duties to two: "Subject to subsection (2), a collecting bank taking a
cash item must (a) forward the item for presentment by some proper
method; and (b) if the item is not paid, return it or send notice of
nonpayment to its transferor."'" Subsection (2) required a collecting
bank to act on an item or notice within a reasonable time after receipt
but in any event before midnight of its next banking day. "
The April 1948 Draft covered only cash items but noted that
rules for non-cash items had not yet been drawn. Such provisions
transit or failure of such item to arrive, but not for any loss caused by delay of the
depositor in furnishing a duplicate.
The August Comment to the August draft reads:
Section 713. Loss of Cash Items in Transit. It is very clear that this radically
alters the present theory. The cases say, quite unanimously, that the risk of mail
loss or delay is on the customer.
Of course, as in other cases of bailments the plaintiffs prima facie case is made
out when failure to re-deliver or credit the proceeds is shown, and the burden of
explanation is on the bank.
The cases also generally hold that a bank forwarding an item is under a duty to
trace the item. The present system used in cash item transit departments, appar-
ently, does not set up a specific tracing system, but when accounts are reconciled
discrepancies caused by non-arrival of an entire cash letter are revealed. As a
practical matter, however, banks may find it difficult to prove a mailing, other
than through general practice, which may not convince a jury. One insurance
company has intimated that many claims for items allegedly lost on bank prem-
ises may be really cases of a loss in the mails. The change made by the section
may be more theoretical than real. ...
Basic to the present section is the assumption that, in view of the termination of
general negotiability provided in Section 710 [indorsement by bank's limiting
transfer; see U.C.C. § 4-201(2)], a cheap form of blanket insurance can be made
available to banks. The point requires further exploration with representatives of
the insurance companies.
Id. at Comment 1.
Note that the immediately preceding section of these drafts made a bank that forwarded
an item to an intermediary bank liable to its transferor and to all prior parties for the conduct
of any subsequent intermediary bank, but not for the conduct of the payor bank. There was,
therefore, no need to provide specifically for any delays due to another bank's actions.
144. U.C.C. § 708(1) (Draft No. 2, July 1948).
145. U.C.C. § 708(2) (Draft No. 2, July 1948).
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were included in the July 1948 Draft, which provided that the general
duties of a collecting bank taking a non-cash item were:
[To] use diligence and good faith
(a) to have the item presented in the proper manner to the proper
party at the proper time; and
(b) to complete the collection; and
(c) to notify its transferor of any non-completion; and
(d) upon dishonor of the item to take the action necessary to pre-
serve the liability of any secondary parties.14 6
The notes and comments to the July 1948 Draft were published on
August 2, 1948 and stated that the purposes of the section under dis-
cussion were:
To adopt the Massachusetts rule for the responsibility of a collect-
ing bank; the duty imposed is one of diligence and good faith and
includes a duty to use due diligence to keep its transferor informed
of any miscarriage in the mails or of any failure by a correspondent
to take proper action on the item. To perform this duty, the bank
will be obliged to trace non-cash items if a report is not received in
a reasonable time ....
As there is no absolute duty to complete the collection, the
bank is not responsible for loss in the mails or for negligence of its
carefully chosen correspondents. 147
The distinction between handling cash items and noncash items
was eliminated later at the insistence of the Committee of Counsel of
the Federal Reserve Banks on the proposed Code.14 The application
of the New York rule for correspondents in the case of cash items was
abandoned. 149 The present section 4-202 resulted from a consolidation
of the separate rules in prior drafts for cash items and non-cash
items. 150
Throughout the drafting process, the liability of collecting banks
was "the amount of the item reduced by an amount which could not
have been realized by the use of proper handling."'' This standard
still applies under U.C.C. section 4-103(5) for "a failure to exercise
ordinary care in handling an item."'' 52 This presumably includes, in
the case of cash items, both the forward journey and the return jour-
146. U.C.C. § 721 (Draft No. 2, July 1948).
147. August Comments to Draft No. 2, supra note 143, at 23-24.
148. A Committee of Counsel for the Federal Reserve Banks, headed by the late 0. J.
Schlaijker, Esq., of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, was adamant that then-present
practices should not be codified, as Professor Leary well remembers.
149. U.C.C. § 4-202 comment 4.
150. See supra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., § 750(1) (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, July 1948).
152. U.C.C. § 4-103(5) (1978).
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ney. The change from liability for improper handling to liability for
lack of ordinary care, in a systems approach, should not be significant.
But what of a failure to warn of dangers resulting from an exten-
sion of the supposed overall transit time, which is the basis for bank
holds on accounts? The depositary bank is clearly relying upon its
customer's credit, plus the percentage chances that deposited checks
will clear, when it permits withdrawals before the normal transit time
has elapsed. When the customer is new, or where the deposited item
drastically inflates normal balances, the depositary bank customarily
places the hold.
Both Judge Knapp and Judge Haight felt that the system and an
overriding duty to exercise ordinary care required that a notice of
diversion be given in some manner. The result reached by each court
is unsatisfactory insofar as it is dependent upon jury findings of fore-
seeability. The result thus lacks the precision needed in rules gov-
erning a bulk, rapidly moving, and automated paper sorting system.
Further, no legislature examined anything but the final official draft
approved just before legislative consideration. Hence, prior drafts,
while historically interesting, are not evidence of the legislative intent
of any legislature adopting the U.C.C.
In determining the meaning of "loss or delay in transit," it may
be convenient to analogize the functions of intermediary banks to
those of a railroad. Time spent in a railroad yard for switching and
for train make-up is still time spent "in transit." '53 If a railroad car is
diverted to a wrong destination and has to be returned to the yard to
be sent to the proper destination, it would still be considered in transit
during the diversion and return to the yard, as well as during the
second journey out of the yard to the correct destination.
In the MICR fraud cases, the judges considered the comments to
one subsection in the 1948 drafts, without considering the impact on
the system of changes thereafter made in other sections. The 1948
cash item/noncash item structure was entirely removed in subsequent
drafting. The 1948 drafts involved a system in which a bank handling
153. Bush v. Florida ex rel. Dade County, 140 Fla. 277, 191 So. 515 (1939) (property tax);
Davis v. A. F. Gossett & Sons, 30 Ga. App. 576, 118 S.E. 773 (1923) (Interstate Commerce
Commission Act); Stein-McMurray Ins., Inc. v. Highlander Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 818, 821, 520
P.2d 865, 868 (1974) ("in transit" and "during transportation" within commercial property
policy included time between leaving point of departure until safe arrival); Den Gre Plastics
Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 107 N.J. Super. 535, 540, 259 A.2d 485, 490 (Law Div. 1969)
(" 'In transit' ordinarily means movement of goods on transporting conveyance from starting
point to point of delivery, including stops along the way, incidental to carriage"); Brown v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 85 S.C. 495, 67 S.E. 146 (1910) (telegraph); Pennsylvania Nat'l.
Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 579 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (rental van "in
transit" while parked overnight in motel parking lot).
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a cash item was subjected to the New York collection rule, which
made the initial collecting bank liable for the actions of subsequent
banks in the collection chain. Hence, there was no need to include
consideration of anything but movement between banks in the phrase
"loss or destruction in transit." The final drafts, however, adopted
the Massachusetts rule throughout the collection process, and elimi-
nated any cash item/collection item distinctions. We believe this
change affected the meaning of the phrase "any loss or delay in
transit" in U.C.C. section 4-202(l)(e).
A problem arises, however, by reason of the wording of U.C.C.
section 4-202(3), which is the direct descendant of the subsection
which used the phrase "in transit" in the 1948 drafts. Subsection (3)
states that a bank "is not liable ... for loss or destruction of an item in
transit or in the possession of others." Does the reference to "others"
require an interpretation of "in transit" to mean only mere physical
movement time, without regard to the needs of a system based on no
notice of implementation and with "funds availability" based on a
lapse of time without notice of nonpayment? We think not. Besides,
there is a difference between responsibility for what happens else-
where, whether known or not, and the duty to give notice upon
receipt of actual knowledge, specifically, knowledge that a depositary
bank's receipt of notice of nonpayment will be delayed.
Who, then, are the "others" referred to in U.C.C. section 4-
202(3)? One group would be the payor banks, since under the rail-
road analogy they are the consignees. Hence the position under the
redrafted Code that payor banks are "in possession" for processing
for the entire period of a midnight deadline'5 4 should not preclude a
court from determining that a diversion causes a delay in transit,
when actual knowledge thereof is also required to trigger the duty to
send a notice. In today's world, independent item processors would
also fit under the words "in the possession of others." '155
We suggest that the different function of each of the two subsec-
tions should also be considered in determining the two interpreta-
tions. U.C.C. section 4-202(3) involves an exculpation where narrow
interpretations are customarily made. The subsection deals with lia-
bility and changed an established common law rule in a number of
154. The provision for direct sending to a payor bank, U.C.C. section 4-202(1), and the
deferred posting provision of U.C.C. section 4-301(1) necessarily assume possession by the
payor bank.
155. There are at least three instances where the items will be in the possession of another:
use of remote processing centers operated by payor banks, having other banks do part of the
"pay-processing" of items, or, as is the case with Travelers Express Co., having credit union
share drafts truncated.
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states. 56 It also deals with "loss or destruction" only.
On the other hand, U.C.C. section 4-202(1)(e) deals with relay-
ing actual knowledge about events which will defer the receipt of
notice of nonpayment. Narrow interpretation of this section is inap-
propriate and, indeed, approaches the interpretations employed in the
reading of common law pleadings long years ago, namely reading
with a zeal fired to pervert. Such a reading would result in an inter-
pretation of U.C.C. section 4-202(l)(e) and U.C.C. section 4-202(3)
that no notice was required to be given under the former upon learn-
ing of a destruction of an item since the latter obviously treated
destruction as something different from loss. Hence, destruction
would not be covered by the word "loss" in subsection (1)(e) and no
notice of destruction would thus be required.
Such narrow and picayune readings violate the basic principle
that a statute is not to be interpreted in a manner that would treat the
legislature as a body composed solely of the northerly portions of
south-bound horses. As Grant Gilmore once said, courts should
"read the Code cheerfully."' 57 Courts should be fired with a cheerful
zeal to make the Code work sensibly on the system it covers even if
time has wrought more technological changes in the system than were
dreamt of by the drafters.'58
The two MICR fraud decisions discussed in this article both
agree in finding a duty to warn of the delayed receipt of a notice of
nonpayment. Judge Knapp wanted evidence that discrepancies
between the location of the named bank and the routing numbers in
the MICR line indicated fraud more often than honest error. Judge
Haight felt that several foreseeability tests should be put before a jury
with full evidence of usual conduct. Neither considered the impact on
automated processing of the uncertainties raised by their rulings.
Neither appreciated the careful distinctions made in U.C.C. section 4-
202(1) between a bank's duty with respect to its own actions and the
actions of other banks where actual knowledge is a prerequisite to any
duty to act. Nor did either judge recognize that a depositary bank
needs notice of the diversion of good checks, as well as fraudulent
ones.
As we have shown, appropriate statutory construction under a
156. See supra note 143.
157. American Law Institute/Amercian Bar Association Commission on Continuing Legal
Education, meetings conducted during 1966-67 (Professor Leary was present).
158. U.C.C. § 4-101 comment 1 (1978) ("There is needed a uniform statement of the
principal rules of the bank collection process with ample provision for flexibiliy to meet the
needs of the large volume handled and the changing needs and conditions that are bound to
come with the years."). See also U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b).
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systems approach leads to the result for which we contend, since it
leads to proper results in other cases. Yet two excellent judges, other-
wise quite sensitive to the system, have taken a different course. We
cannot expect all other judges to interpret the Code with greater
finesse. If changes in articles three and four are to be proposed, 59
such changes should make it crystal clear for all judges that the basis
of U.C.C. section 4-202 is a duty of due care by a bank as to its own
actions and that, except for transfers of what it receives to its trans-
feror, action need only be taken to warn that transferor upon receipt
of actual knowledge of facts showing that a collection or return jour-
ney will go or has gone awry. In MICR fraud cases, this places the
burden of giving a notice of diversion upon one bank only, the divert-
ing bank, be it an intermediary or one to whom the item was
presented for payment. Recipients of such a notice have the duty to
forward it.' 60 If the pressures for funds availability force the adoption
of reduced hold periods, the need for notice of diversions will be much
greater than it is today, and these statutes must provide for extensions
of holds on receipt of such notices.
B. Regulation J
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System recently
amended Regulation J to impose liability for the failure of a payor
bank to comply with the requirement of an electronic advice of non-
payment on items over $2,500, and to provide that a bank failing to
use ordinary care in doing so is liable for damages up to the amount of
the item, less any sums which could not have been recovered by the
159. In 1977, the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code created the
3-4-8 Committee to study the need for revision of articles three and four, among other things.
Following an invitational meeting at Williamsburg, Virginia in the spring of 1978, the
Permanent Editorial Board instructed the 3-4-8 Committee to proceed with attempts to draft a
statute that would embrace both the check collection system and other payment systems. See
Memorandum to National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws from Hal S.
Scott, Reporter to the 3-4-8 Committee, dated June 15, 1983. In the fall of 1983, a second
conference was convened at Williamsburg to discuss the then most recent draft of the New
Payments Code. This complex and comprehensive drafting effort drew intense criricism. It
appeared that there was little support for the code in the form it then took.
In June 1984, the Permanent Editorial Board decided to continue its attempts to develop
a comprehensive payments code, but without the consumer protection provisions. Thereafter,
following discussions with various interest groups, the Permanent Editorial Board
reformulated the project to include the drafting of a law governing wholesale wire transfers
and the updating of the law applicable to paper transfers. As of the writing of this article, this
has become the official position of the American Law Institute and National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Law. See Mooney, Introduction to 1985 Annual Survey of
the UCC, 41 Bus. LAW. - (Aug. 1986).
160. U.C.C. § 4-202(1); US.F.& G., 590 F. Supp. at 492-94 (Judge Haight's discussion of
the duty to transmit notices).
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use of such care. 161 One might consider adding to that a duty to wire
notice on diverted items. The intermediary banks would forward such
notices electronically. The volume and expense would not be great.
The expense could be considered a trade-off in return for receipt of
similar protective notices if that bank's deposited items were diverted.
On the other hand, the bank to which an item is missent has no
prior connection with the item or its drawer, so why impose the
expense on it if it merely returns the item to its transferor? On the
whole, to us, placing the burden on the diverting bank, even if it had
no other connection with the diverted item, seems a more appropriate
choice. Factual determinations as to which bank had the duty to send
the notice should not be dependent on jury findings as to foreseeabil-
ity, but rather upon the diverting bank's own action.
C. U.C Section 4-103(5)
Some tinkering with U.C.C. section 4-103(5) is perhaps also in
order. In the case of the fraudulent check or even the ordinary bad
check, where the failure to exercise ordinary care results in permitted
withdrawals because no notice of nonpayment arrived, the loss is
measurable, but may not be the face amount of the item. Section 4-
103(5) presently bars any recovery in such cases because nothing
would have been recovered had ordinary care been used. 162 The dam-
ages should include recovery of any withdrawal permitted after the
lapse of the "reasonable time" permitted by U.C.C. section 4-213(4),
reduced by any recovery shown to be obtainable from the customer of
the depositary bank. The bank seeking recovery must prove that, had
a notice been sent, it would have been received in time to prevent, and
would in fact have prevented the withdrawal of some or all of the
credit. 163 Since the liability is for a failure to exercise ordinary care,
namely negligence, the defenses to such liability should also apply.
In addition, uniformity is needed in the courts' treatment of the
effect of contributory negligence. This necessity is illustrated by the
US. F & G. H case since Maryland, the place of the depositary bank,
adheres to a common law contributory negligence defense,'" 4 while
New York, where defendants were located, applies a rule of compara-
161. 50 Fed. Reg. 5734 (1985). See supra note 129.
162. Thus, in U.S.F.& G., the loss would literally have been $880,650 minus zero, whereas
only about $754,000 had been withdrawn. The formula here should, if the face amount of the
item is to be used, provide for the subtraction of any balance which is not withdrawn from the
account.
163. Some cases have reached the proper result when dealing with a claim that a "wire
notice," if sent, could have stopped a withdrawal. See supra note 114.
164. C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL app. H (1978).
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tive negligence in tort cases. 165 Yet, as Judge Haight noted in his
order granting summary judgment, tort concepts of fault are singu-
larly inappropriate to the check collection system. This system "was
designed to facilitate commerce primarily by guiding and making pre-
dictable the consequences of behavior." '66 The Code generally allo-
cates losses on the basis of which party would ordinarily be in the best
position to prevent the loss.167 Judge Haight turned to the rules relat-
ing to forgeries under the Code in order to find the rule of decision.
He reasoned that the loss allocation in the forgery rules was particu-
larly well developed and sensitive to the system. Judge Haight
refused to determine which of the parties should initially bear the loss
in the case of MICR fraud, but did utilize U.C.C. section 3-406 as the
basis for analogizing a rule of contributory negligence, shifting the
loss to a negligent depositary bank. 68
A clear and country-wide uniform rule would promote settle-
ment of disputes and furnish a firm basis for alternative dispute reso-
lution procedures. It would encourage depositary banks to exercise
reasonable care for their own safety, without requiring manual inspec-
tion of each deposited item. U.C.C. section 4-103(5) should, there-
fore, specify a negligence rule of defense. A proper rule, however,
should only find this defensive negligence where a bank permits a
withdrawal in the face of actual knowledge of facts or conduct of the
customer which indicates the fraudulent nature of the item involved,
or in the face of knowledge of such facts outside of the face of the
check as would make the forwarding for collection of the item an act
of bad faith. 1 69
165. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. R. § 1411 (McKinney 1975). Despite the rising popularity of
comparative negligence, the authors suggest that the preferable rule in the check collection
system should be one of contributory negligence. The weighing of relative fault which is
required by a comparative negligence system is inconsistent with an automated processing
system in which many tasks are performed mechanically and automatically. A comparative
negligence system would require an examination of intentions and introduce the foreseeability
factors of the US.F.& G. decision, which are so undesirable. See supra text accompanying
note 106.
166. 620 F. Supp. at 21.
167. Id. at 22. It should be noted, however, that the shift of the loss in U.C.C. section 3-406
works only in favor of holders in due course and innocent payors. In MICR fraud cases, no
one will have paid the instrument, and it is questionable if an intermediary bank losing its right
of charge back by its diversion of the item qualifies as a holder in due course.
168. Id. at 370-73.
169. A failure to investigate for fear of what an investigation would show indicates a lack of
good faith. See Maley v. East Side Bank, 361 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1966); McCarthy v.
Kasperak, 3 Ohio App. 3d 206, 444 N.E.2d 472 (1981).
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D. Other Provisions
A bank should be able to extend its hold period upon receipt of a
notice of diversion because such notice provides knowledge that a
longer than normal time may elapse before the bank receives a notice
of dishonor or nonpayment. Equally, upon receipt of such notice, the
depositary bank should have the option of placing a hold, if it has not
already done so. Language in any revision should specify that credit
for deposited items is provisional even if no hold is placed, so that the
customer may be subjected to an extension of the customary holds
when the bank receives a notice of delayed returns.
The right of "charge-back" under U.C.C. section 4-212 would
not seem to be triggered by a notice of delay. By the wording of the
section, charge-back is conditional on the receipt of a final notice of
nonpayment. An added phrase may be needed to cover extensions of
a "hold" period. Indeed, in MICR fraud cases, a right of charge-back
would be cold comfort except when exercised before any withdrawal,
or in those very few instances where a solvent depositor may have
accepted such a check. The basic protection must prevent a
withdrawal.
Jurisdictions with funds availability statutes should amend them
to ensure that, in the case of both MICR fraud and mistakenly mis-
sent genuine items, provision is made to enable a bank receiving a
notice of diversion to extend its hold period without incurring liabil-
ity. Since, in some cases, these statutes may not be an integral part of
the Code, the escape valve of U.C.C. section 1-103 would not be avail-
able, although it is doubtful that any court faced with a blatant MICR
fraud case would permit a recovery against a bank that extends its
hold period in such a situation. The problem could arise, however, in
the context of a missent genuine check with a claim for wrongful dis-
honor due to the extended hold. Since the funds availability statutes
also require disclosure, banks should disclose to their customers the
circumstances in which they will extend holds.
Finally, revisers should consider whether the warranty rules of
U.C.C. section 4-207(1) need adjustment or have an application that
might be contrary to the solution adopted for the problems of MICR
fraud and missent items. There is no warranty that an item is the
genuine, nonfraudulent instrument it purports to be. The five warran-
ties in U.C.C. section 4-207(2) plus the provisions of U.C.C. sections
3-405 and 3-406 do cover the known pre-MICR frauds. Unless the
drawer is precluded, the normal breach of warranty result is to place
the entire liability on the first person after the drawer who dealt
directly with the malefactor. A similar result would normally be
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reached in MICR fraud cases under a literal application of U.C.C.
section 4-103(5) since, even if ordinary care had been used in such
cases, no recovery could have been obtained on the instrument. Yet,
in the case of MICR fraud, we urge a different rule. Both courts and
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System have felt that a
different rule should apply in cases of failure to give wire notice of
nonpayment on large items. Hence, we conclude that no change
should be made in the warranty provisions. Depositary banks will
receive adequate protection by a rule requiring notice of diversion if
they also have the ability to extend holds and thus to extend the right
to cancel the provisional credit.
Due to the large number of checks to be processed and routed
among more than 40,000 depositary institutions, imposing a strict
warranty liability on depositary banks seems unwarranted. Felons
can commit MICR fraud by using two distant banks in the same Fed-
eral Reserve District. Then there would be no discrepancy between
the printed name on the item and the opening four digits of the rout-
ing symbol in the MICR line. Indeed, detection at the point of
deposit violates the principle that liability should be placed on the
bank able to abort a wrongful intrusion into the payments process at
the least cost. In order to detect a MICR fraud, the depositary bank
personnel would have to make a thinking examination of every depos-
ited item. Failure to do so should not be negligence except in excep-
tional circumstances. The bank diverting a return item to another
bank, rather than sending it back to the depositary bank, has made a
choice as to that item only. It has chosen to take it out of the system
on which depositary banks base their hold periods. Hence, an obliga-
tion to notify is no great burden. It applies only to items that have
potential to cause a banking loss due to an extension of the journey
time. It does not require a thinking examination of every deposited
item, nor of every return item, but requires sending a notice only after
actual knowledge is acquired. If no notice of diversion is sent and yet
the item is paid by the second bank, no loss would result from the
failure to give notice of diversion, except for a small loss of interest
arising from allowing withdrawals a couple of days earlier than would
have been the case.
One final consideration. Should the accountability rules of
U.C.C. section 4-302(a) apply to an item used in a MICR fraud? Since
the use of the MICR line arose after the Code scheme was set, and
became widespread only after 1956, we can postulate that the drafters
did not consider MICR fraud in the determination of what defenses to
list in the preamble to U.C.C. section 4-302.
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Analysis must proceed through several stages. Do we want to
impose liability for failing to revoke the provisional credit within the
midnight deadline on a bank to which a fraudulent item has been
sent? In MICR fraud cases where there was a discrepancy in the
numbers and the name, the courts have struggled to determine which
of the two banks is the payor bank or whether they are both subject to
payor bank liability. If neither is a payor bank, then U.C.C. section 4-
302 has no application. If either or both are payor banks, then can
accountability be defeated under the present preamble using the
words "or the like"? 17° If it cannot now be defeated, does proper pol-
icy require that accountability be defeated by amendment? If it can
be defeated, does any strong policy require the imposition of
accountability?
First, what is the rule of U.C.C. section 4-302(a) as to payor
banks today? The preamble reads: "In the absence of a valid defense
such as breach of a presentment warranty (subsection (1) of section 4-
207) settlement effected or the like, if .... ,171 The issue then
becomes whether a cash item tainted with MICR fraud is "like" unto
a cash item tainted by a breach of warranty.1 72 The two most analo-
gous presentment warranties are the warranty of good title and
absence of alteration. They cover the two most prevalent pre-Code
check frauds-the forged endorsement and the artful alteration. Skill-
fully conducted MICR fraud is indeed a most artful alteration. It is
usually a total creation of the depositing payee, as are some altera-
tions. Hence, we conclude that a court could accept a defense of "or
the like" as covering MICR fraud, as Judge Haight impliedly did in
US.F &G. Should a court do so?
The policy underlying the defense and the warranty seems to be
one of risk allocation, based on notions of which bank can best protect
the collection system when that system has two points of visual exam-
170. U.C.C. § 4-302 (1978).
171. Id.
172. Judge Haight treated First Pennsylvania Bank, the bank designated by the words on
the check in USE & G., as the payor bank. He ruled that the gross negligence of Union Trust
barred its recovery under U.C.C. § 4-302(a). See 620 F. Supp. at 373.
Martin held, without discussion, that a bank solely indicated by the MICR routing line,
when name and fraction indicated another drawee, was not a payor bank. 609 P.2d at 676,
679. In Oneida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Cent. N. Y. v. Union Bank of Cal., the trial judge
ruled on motion for summary determination of issues that counterfeit official checks of the
nonexistent "London Office, 95 Duke St., WI" of "Israel Discount Bank, Limited" did not
designate Union Bank as a payor bank where there was no printed name of a bank drawee on
the item. No. C 372, 643, slip op. at 2 (Sup. Ct. of Cal., County of Los Angeles Dec. 29, 1983).
The American Bankers Association routing fraction, however, and the MICR line routing
symbol were those of Union Bank of California, and thus would seem to designate it, under
Federal Reserve Regulation J, with reasonable certainty. See supra note 54.
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ination of items-at the point of deposit and at the point of payment
as to alterations. The drafters selected the point of deposit. As to
forgeries, the theory was that a payor bank could best protect against
forgeries of its drawer's signature by signature comparisons, aided by
the statement reconciliation duties of its customer. As to forged
indorsements, the theory was that banks should not accept items for
collection from those who were not credit-worthy. Whether these
risk allocations are valid today is beyond the scope of this article.
We do feel, however, that MICR fraud is sufficiently analogous
to a material alteration that it should be specifically treated in the
Code's midnight deadline accountability rules for payor banks. Spe-
cifically, we suggest that the matter be treated in U.C.C. section 4-
108, as a separate subsection providing that a bank to which an item
has been sent with an encoded account number not compatible with
that bank's account numbering system may obtain an extra day for
processing simply by sending a notice to its transferor before its mid-
night deadline expires. The notice must describe the item so that it
will be identifiable to the depositary bank. The notice could only be
given in the case of items where the account number in the MICR line
does not designate an active account in the bank, and a name search
of the bank's records is necessary to determine if the named drawer is
a customer of the bank. The extra day would not be obtainable for
other defects in the MICR line which are correctable by standard
machine processing procedures, or clearly designate another bank in
the printed words.
Furthermore, in such cases, the bank should not be accountable
for the full amount of the item. Whether designated by the MICR
line or by printed name, a payor bank not returning the item by its
midnight deadline and not giving the notice in timely fashion never-
theless should not be liable for more than the amount of any with-
drawals allowed after a normally returned item or a timely sent notice
would have been received. A notice given to a presenting bank or
other intermediary bank should of course be promptly forwarded, as
is required for notices of dishonor by U.C.C. section 4-202(1)(b).
The extra time allowance is justified by the same policy underly-
ing the inclusion of the phrase "taking proper action within a reason-
ably longer time may be seasonable. . . ." in U.C.C. section 4-202(2).
The midnight deadline limits are based on the assumption that the
items fit the system. Digits in a MICR line that do not fit the system
make the item one that does not fit the system, and thus an extension
of the midnight deadline is justified, but only if notice of the extension
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is given. In the bulk cash item process, obtaining the consent of the
transferor is not practicable.
Why would we give the right to an extra day to possibly three
banks: the MICR line designated bank, the fractionally designated
bank, and the bank designated by the printed name? The reason is
that, contrary to the rulings of the courts to date, 173 all three banks
should be held to be designated payor banks in the alternative, since
the definition of an order in U.C.C. section 3-102(l)(b) states, not that
the drawee's name must be printed alphabetically, but only that the
drawee must be reasonably identified. A numerical designation,
understandable by the operators of the automated system, reasonably
identifies the bank with that designation as a "person to pay.,,' 74 Sec-
tion 3-102(l)(b) continues that the order may be addressed to one or
more persons jointly or in the alternative, but not in succession. 75
Hence, one can conclude that each bank so designated numerically or
by printed name is a bank "by which the item is payable as drawn or
accepted" since, in MICR fraud cases, the drawer or the fraudulent
payee is the creator-drawer-of the instrument. Technically, when
any designated bank refuses to pay the item, it has dishonored the
item because section 3-504(3)(a) provides that presentment "may be
made to any one of two or more... drawees .... ,' 76 Thus, banks
have a choice when a numerically designated bank does not pay an
item sent to it for payment. They can return it as dishonored, or they
can divert it from the return journey to another designated payor, but
in such an event, to preserve the integrity of the system, the diverting
bank must send the depositary bank a notice of the delay in transit.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has rec-
ognized the effect on the system of automation's shift from words to
figures. Regulation J now provides that no Federal Reserve Bank
incurs liability to its sender, or anyone else, for routing an item in
accordance with either the MICR line routing number or the routing
173. See supra note 172. The old rule of law that words control figures, in today's
automated banking world, should be changed. See supra note 134.
174. U.C.C. § 3-102(l)(b).
175. From this analysis, one could conclude that the item, when returned by the first bank,
was dishonored. Because drawees in succession are not permitted, the item could be returned
to the depositary bank, when dishonored by any one of the joint or alternate drawees. See
U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(b). Today, however, banks often present dishonored cash items again
automatically. A diversion based on notice to the depositary bank should be treated as a
second presentment. Where there are alternate drawees, a second presentment can be made to
the other designated drawee. The prohibition against drawees in succession is merely designed
to prevent a drawer from requiring several presentments before the drawer's liability ripens




fraction. '" Since the duty is to send for presentment, the justification
is that the system requires that any bank so designated is a bank by
which the item is payable as drawn.
The existence in U.C.C. section 3-118(c) of the old saw that
"words control figures" may require a special provision in the defini-
tion of payor bank in article four. When drafting article three, Wil-
liam Prosser, Reporter, told his Associate Reporter, Fairfax Leary,
Jr., that the rule of U.C.C. section 3-118(c) was not supported by the
empirical evidence he had seen. Revisers of article three would do
well, in the computerized and increasingly digital world we live in,
more than thirty years after the Code was drafted, to suggest the very
change that Prosser felt was really not practicable in 1948-1950. In
the routing of checks, figures govern words.
IV. CONCLUSION
We offer the solutions herein as suggestions to be considered for
resolution of a complicated problem that has resulted from automa-
tion in the collection of cash items and the negative notice of payment
character of the system. If we have done no more than emphasize the
interrelation of numerous sections of article four and the necessity for
judges and others working with problems to consider the impact on
the system as a whole of any proposed ruling or amendment, then our
effort will not have been wasted.
The true function of the Code is to keep the system operating
smoothly when new technical improvements appear and are adopted
for the benefit of those interested in the ninety nine percent of items
that are good. If the words of the Code are read in the light of the
needs of the system as it exists today, it becomes evident that the Code
is a document suitable for its basic purpose of permitting "the contin-
ued expansion of commercial practices." This should be accom-
plished through interpretation as well as "through custom, usage, and
agreement of the parties." Courts outside the domain of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit are free, as we have shown, to inter-
pret existing law in a manner which will protect the system from suc-
cessful MICR frauds. In view of the precedents being created,
however, and the distinguished judges creating the precedents,
amendments to the relevant statutes and regulations may well be the
better solution.
As W. S. Gilbert wrote in another connection, we say to our
readers
177. 12 C.F.R. § 210.6(a)(2) (1985).
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[T]he night has been long -
Ditto ditto [our] song - and
Thank goodness they're both of them over!'" s
178. W. GILBERT & A. SULLIVAN, The Nightmare Song of the Lord Chancellor in
IOLANTHE, Act 11 (1882).
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